突发公共卫生事件协同防控策略的随机演化决策分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2078

Abstract

Abstract:

Frequent public health emergencies have brought severe challenges to the life and property of the country and the people， and strengthening the collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies has become an important issue in social governance. Aiming at the high uncertainty in the process of strategy interaction and behavior evolution between local governments and the public in public health emergencies， a stochastic evolutionary game model for collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies is constructed to analyze the evolutionary stability strategy and evolution process of local governments and the public. It is found that the local government evolves to the stable strategy faster than the public； The stochastic interference factors will slow down the speed at which local governments and thepublic evolve into stable strategies； When the probability of epidemic spreading gradually increases， the impact on the change of local government strategy is greater， followed by the public. With the increasing of punishment coefficient to local government and the public， local government and the public are more inclined to choose （active prevention and control， voluntary isolation） strategy， and the local government has a stronger response to punishment. The stochastic evolution decision-making model for collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies constructed in the article provides theoretical reference and practical basis for scientific prevention of public health emergencies.

Key words: public health emergencies, collaborative prevention and control, stochastic disturbance, stochastic evolutionary game

CLC Number:

D035

Fangju Jia,Kun Zhou,Lianshui Li. Stochastic Evolutionary Decision Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control Strategies for Public Health Emergencies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(3): 237-247.

Figures/Tables 8

参数	定义	范围	参数	定义	范围
$L$	疫情大范围扩散带来的经济损失	$L ≥ 0$	$R 1$	积极防控时的社会效益	$R 1 ≥ 0$
$c$	地方政府积极防控产生的成本	$c ≥ 0$	$R 2$	防控松懈时的社会效益	$R 2 ≥ 0$
$b$	社会公众流动受到的惩罚	$b > a$	$m$	上级政府的防控补贴	$m ≥ 0$
$a$	社会公众自愿隔离造成的损失	$a ≥ 0$	$r$	自愿隔离规避的损失	$r ≥ 0$
$e$	个人支付的治疗费用	$e ≥ 0$	$w$	自由流动获取的利益	$w ≥ 0$
$D$	地方政府防控不利受到的处罚	$D > 0$	$n$	某一地区的人数	$n > 0$
$p 1$	政府防控松懈疫情扩散概率	$p 1 > p 2$	$p 2$	政府积极防控疫情扩散概率	$p 2 ≥ 0$

策略	地方政府
策略		积极防控	防控松懈
社会公众	自愿隔离	$R 1 + m - c$ ， $r - a$	$R 2 + m, ? ? ? ? r - a - e$
社会公众	自由流动	$R 1 + m - c - p 2 L$ ， $w - b - p 2 L / n$	$R 2 + m - p 1 L - D, ? ? ? ? w - p 1 L / n - e$

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Stochastic Evolutionary Decision Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control Strategies for Public Health Emergencies

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