Abstract:

The mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises helps to realize the decisive role of the market in resource allocation. China's state-owned enterprise reform is in full swing， but the effect remains to be tested. The mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is essentially a process of institutional change， which may have the problem of path dependence. During the reform process， the post-reform enterprise may adhere to a certain institutional path in the original enterprise， and the institutional path may be efficient or inefficient. This inefficient institutional path is precisely the reason for institutional changes， and it may still exist in reformed enterprises. In the practice of China's capital market， is there a path problem？ Are there significant differences in financing constraints between reformed private enterprises and start-up private enterprises？ Are these differences different in full equity replacement and partial equity replacement of reformed private enterprises？Taking the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises as the background， private enterprises with different source of ownership are selected as samples to empirically test the differences in financing constraints and corporate efficiency between start-up private enterprises and reformed private enterprises， and the extent of this difference in the reformed private enterprises is explored with full and partial ownership replacement. The moderating effect of group company before mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is studied. Model（1） is designed：F-constraint_i，t =β₀₊β₁Pte-origin_i，t /Sos-dual_i，t /Sos-degree_i，t +\sumControls+ε_i，t， to test the degree of financing constraints after the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises， and further to test whether there is a path dependence problem. Model （2） is designed： EOE_i，t ==β₀₊β₁Pte-origin_i，t /Sos-dual_i，t /Sos-degree_i，t +\sumControls+ε_i，t and model （3） is designed： EIE_i，t =β₀₊β₁Pteorigin_i，t /Sos-dual_i，t /Sos-degree_i，t +\sumControls+ε_i，t， to test the operating efficiency and investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises after mixed-ownership reform. Further， this paper explores whether the path dependence problem of state-owned enterprises after mixed-ownership reform is more serious in non-first-tier state-owned enterprises， so model（4） is designed： F-constraint_i，t =β₀₊β₁Com-group_i，t +\sumControls+ε_i，t and model （5） is designed： F-constraint_i，t =β₀₊β₁Com-group_i，t + β₂Sos-degree_i，t +β₃Com-group_i，t ×Sos-degree_i，t +\sumControls+ε_i，t， to test whether it will increase the degree of path dependence if the state-owned enterprise is a subsidiary of group company before the reform.The empirical results show that the coefficient of Pte-origin in model （1） is 0.115， passing the 10% significance test； the coefficient of Sos-dual is -0.077， passing the 10% significance test； the coefficient of Sos-degree is -0.132， passing the 5% significance test， these all show that there is a problem of path dependence after the mixed-ownership reform. The coefficients of Pte-origin in model （2） and model （3） are 0.007 and -0.004 respectively， both of which have passed the 10% significance test， indicating that start-up private enterprises have higher operational efficiency and investment efficiency. The coefficient of Sos-dual didn’t pass the significance test， indicating that whether the reformed private enterprise still holds state-owned equity has nothing to do with the operating efficiency and investment efficiency of the enterprise. the coefficient of Sos-degree in model （2） and model （3） are 0.007 and -0.004 respectively， which have passed the 10% and 5% significance test， indicating that the higher the proportion of state-owned equity in reformed private enterprises， the lower the operating efficiency and investment efficiency. The regression coefficient of the Com-group variable in model （4） is -0.135， passing the 10% significance test； the regression coefficient of the Com-group variable in model （5） is -0.149， passing the 10% significance test； the regression coefficient of Sos-degree variable is -0.135， which passes the 10% significance test； and the regression coefficient of Com-group*Sos-degree is -0.012， passing the 10% significance test， indicating that the state-owned enterprise before the reform was a subsidiary of group company， then the intensity of financing constraints after the reform is greater than state-owned enterprises that were first-level legal persons before the reform.The research results show that　（1） Compared with reformed private enterprises， start-up private enterprises have a stronger degree of financing constraints. And the existence of state-owned equity or a high proportion of state-owned equity in reformed private enterprises will ease the degree of financing constraints in the market. （2） Compared with reformed private enterprises， start-up private enterprises have higher operational efficiency and investment efficiency. And the higher the proportion of state-owned equity in reformed private enterprises， the lower the operating efficiency and investment efficiency. （3） If the reformed private enterprise is a subsidiary of group company before the reform， the degree of financing constraints it faces after the reform is weaker than that of the state-owned enterprise that was a first-level legal person before the reform.

Key words: mixed-ownership reform, path dependence, group company