Abstract: In s closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with collection and remanufacturing of old products, how to deal with the competitive threat from the external remanufacturer is an important issue for the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). For a two-period CLSC system comprised of an OEM and an independent remanufacturer, the optimal game strategies of both parties are discussed under three different decision structures:two types of competitive mode (competition with remanufacturing patent licensing and competition without remanufacturing patent licensing) and cooperative mode. In all three modes, the OEM produces and sells the new products in the first period. For the competitive mode with patent licensing, the remanufacturer collects and remanufactures the EOL products after the OEM's patent authorization in the second period, and then sells them in the market competing with the OEM. Otherwise, under the competitive mode without patent licensing, the remanufacturer can engage in these activities without the OEM's authorization. For the cooperative mode, the remanufacturer transfers the remanufactured products to the OEM, and then the OEM sells the two kinds of products simultaneously. Backward deduction method is used to derive and compare the optimal prices under the above three modes. The condition under which the remanufacturer engages in collection and remanufacturing is given. The impact of consumer preference for the remanufactured products on the equilibrium solutions and the profits of channel members are analyzed combined with numerical examples. The results show that:(1) From the perspective of environmental performance, the collection rate under the competitive mode without patent licensing is the highest, and then is the cooperative mode, the lowest is the competitive mode with patent licensing. The collection rates under all three modes increase in the consumer preference. (2) From the perspective of channel efficiency, the cooperative mode yields the highest system profit, and then is the competitive mode with patent licensing, the worst is the competitive mode without patent licensing. The total system profit under the competitive mode without patent licensing decreases in the consumer preference, whereas increases in the consumer preference in two other modes. (3) From the perspective of the OEM, he has no motive to cooperate with the remanufacturer if he can take advantage of the patent licensing mechanism to guarantee his own interest. On the contrary, he prefers to cooperate with the remanufacturer without patent licensing, but which meanwhile leads to the profit loss of the remanufacturer. So the reasonable contact should be provided to ensure the operations the cooperative mode. The conclusion of this paper can provide theoretical supports for the OEM to select reasonable competitive strategies or cooperative strategies with the remanufacturer in reality.

Key words: remanufacturing, closed loop supply chain, competition, cooperation, patent licensing, pricing strategies