主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (7): 43-51.

• Articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Buy-back Contracts for a Supply Chain with a Risk-neutral Supplier and a Risk-averse Retailer Who Take Joint Promotion Actions based on CVaR

DAI Jian-sheng1, MENG Wei-dong2   

  1. 1. Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093, China;
    2. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China
  • Received:2012-07-05 Revised:2013-04-30 Online:2014-07-20 Published:2014-07-24

Abstract: Based on CVaR risk measure criterion, the issue is discussed in this paper, that whether or not buy-back contract can coordinate supply chains with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer who take joint promotion actions to sell newsboy goods. Some of management enlightenment is attained. Channel members'optimal decision-making is explored under a given buy-back contract arrangement, and how exogenous parameters, such as buy-back contract parameters, risk aversion coefficient of the retailer, salvage value and shortage cost and so on, affect the optimal decision-making is also investigated. It shows that buy-back contracts, by introducing cost-sharing mechanism, can coordinate not-too-risk-averse supply chains, which cannot be coordinated by conventional buy-back contracts. In particular, salvage value and shortage cost have no effect on the above-mentioned conclusions. However, they exert important impacts on feasible space of buy-back contracts and what supply chain can be coordinated by buyback contracts. The main conclusions are verified by means of numerical analysis.

Key words: supply chain, buy-back contract, joint promotion, CVaR

CLC Number: