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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2002, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 48-52.

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The Study on Supply Chain Stackelberg Game Problem

CHANG Liang-feng, HUANG Xiao-yuan, LU Zhen   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2002-06-12 Online:2002-12-28 Published:2012-03-06

Abstract: In this paper,the common order mode and coordination mode in supply chain are studied,providing a kind of Stackelberg Game in supply chain,in which the seller is the leader initializing the minimum replenishment periods policy,while the buyers are the follower responding with the optimal stock policy.Considering the identical price discount to offset the stock cost increase of the buyer,and the stock cost rationalization of buyer,the cost optimization model of the seller is established under deterministic demand of buyers.Then applying genetic algorithm,simulation works are carried out to off-line computing the Stackelberg equilibrium solution of this problem in Liaoyang Petroleum Company.

Key words: supply chain, Stackelberg game, minimum replenishment periods, price discount, inventory, genetic algorithm, distribution system

CLC Number: