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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2001, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 13-19.

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The Optimum Structure under Asymmetric Information

LEI Xiao-qing   

  1. Dept.of Management, Guangdong Technical Normal Institute, Guangzhou 510630, China
  • Received:2000-04-21 Online:2001-06-28 Published:2012-03-06

Abstract: In contrast to most signaling models,this paper assumes that a higher valued firm is distinguished from its lower valued counterpart by having a cash flow distribution with a lower variance,but with the same mean.Based on this assumption,this paper studies the optimization of capital structure under symmetric information and asymmetric information by use of Game Theory.

Key words: capital structure, signaling model, Nash equilibrium

CLC Number: