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Chinese Journal of Management Science

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E-Retailer’s Strategy of Disclosing Competitor’s Price Based on Customer Trust

LI Xin-jian1,4, WU Chun-mei2, HUANG Ming-xue3, LI Chong-guang1, LI Xiao-ling5   

  1. 1. College of Economics and Management, College of Basic Sciences, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China;
    2. School of Humanities & Social Sciences, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;
    4. College of Basic Sciences, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China;
    5. Business and Administration School, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China
  • Received:2010-06-03 Revised:2011-07-09 Online:2011-10-30 Published:2011-10-30

Abstract: Whether to disclose competitor's price is a dilemma for an E-retailer.To analyze this question,our research builds a utility model of consumer demand,based on E-retailer's reputation,product price,and customer trust.Our game analysis results points out that there would be different results contingent on the different orientation and the reputation of E-retailer.For demand increasing,homogeneous E-retailers should maintain previous choice.For revenue improving,homogeneous E-retailers should disclose competitor's price,heterogeneous E-retailer prefer to set higher price under his demand predominant situation.For consumer surplus improving,homogeneous E-retailer should maintain his previous strategies; if these E-retailers have different reputations,the E-retailer with high reputation will improve more if both of them disclose competitive price,the E-retailer with low reputation will benefit more if there is only one discloses competitive price.

Key words: E-retailer, competitor’s price, disclosing strategy, customer trust

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