Abstract: The paper considers both ultimate control shareholders and direct control shareholders, the two kinds large shareholders, in the same analysis framework, and empirically studies capital allocation selection and efficiency of allocation based on ultimate shareholders' sel-finterest motivation.Here are the conclusions: (1) as the ultimate shareholders' cash flow right proportion getting lower, they have more motivation to increase the self-interest capital investment on the fixed asset, the intangible asset and the longterm equity, which lead to the expansion of the whole investment scale; (2) the ultimate shareholders' self-interest motivation has the most strong influence on investment expansion of local enterprise group, while the most weak influence on the central government enterprise and private enterprise is between the above two; (3) as the control hierar chyincreasing, the fulfill cost of ultimate control shareholders' decision right increasing, then based on the direct control shareholders' share proportion scale, enterprise capital allocation exhibits effects of interest grab and benefit coordination; (4) under incentives of income distribution in situation of higher share proportion, direct control shareholders will decrease self-interest capital allocation, inhibit overinvestment and improve the efficiency of capital allocation.

Key words: ultimate control, direct control, capital investment, allocation efficiency