协议企业储备模式下的应急物资采购储备及补贴策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.2089

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

应急物资协议企业储备模式是政府提高灾后物资供给能力的有效方式之一。为进一步提升双方的合作效益，本文在考虑对未调用物资进行补贴以改进数量柔性契约的基础上，对该储备模式下的物资采购储备及补贴策略问题展开了研究。在推导出企业的最优物资储备策略后，设计了相应的供应链协调机制，并以数量柔性契约为比较基准，证明了补贴柔性契约能够实现物资储备量及整体合作效益水平的共同提升。最后，进一步给出了政企双方实现协调共赢的条件，并发现，随着灾害事件发生概率和物资现货市场采购价格的上升，补贴柔性契约的优越性将更加凸显，但实现双方协调共赢目标的困难程度也在加剧。本文不仅为优化政企合作储备模式提供了策略性指导，更为建立稳定长效的合作关系奠定了理论基础。

关键词: 应急物资储备, 政企合作, 补贴, 契约改进, 供应链协调

Abstract:

The model of emergency material reserved by enterprises is one of the effective approaches for governments to enhance post-disaster supply capability. In order to further improve efficiency of cooperation， research is conducted on the purchase-reserve and subsidy issues of material procurement under the reserve mode， considering subsidizing unused materials to enhance quantity flexibility contracts. After deriving the optimal material reserve strategy for the enterprise， a corresponding supply chain coordination mechanism is designed. Using quantity flexibility contracts as a comparative benchmark， the superiority of subsidy flexibility contracts is proved. Finally， conditions for both the government and the enterprise are also provided to achieve coordinated mutual gains. Specifically， the following conclusions and managerial implications are yielded：（1） Under subsidy flexibility contracts， whether the enterprise chooses to establish a reserve partnership with the government depends not only on the probability of disaster occurrence during the reserve period but also on the procurement price and the level of subsidy offered by the government. If the disaster probability is low， the enterprise will only agree to pre-reserve materials for the government if both the subsidy and procurement price exceed certain thresholds. Conversely， if the disaster probability is high， the enterprise will be inclined to engage in cooperation with the government， regardless of the subsidy level， as long as the procurement price exceeds its critical value. This finding provides a reference for enterprises in deciding whether to participate in cooperation and determining the quantity of material reserves. It also offers theoretical support for governments in setting contract parameters.（2） Although the enterprise may accept the contract for pre-disaster material reserves when the procurement and subsidy prices are favorable， especially when disaster probabilities are low， the government may forgo offering such contracts due to high overall costs. Cooperation based on subsidy flexibility contracts is more likely to emerge when disaster probabilities are high. To enhance the overall cooperation efficiency between the government and the enterprise， the optimal material reserve strategy is explored under centralized decision-making and a supply chain coordination mechanism is proposed. This mechanism is found to be solely dependent on material-related costs and prices， and it is not influenced by the disaster occurrence probability or the specific distribution of post-disaster material demand. This simplifies the design of coordination mechanisms for the government and demonstrates the robustness and practical value of the proposed approach. Since the overall cooperation efficiency remains unchanged with subsidy price， both parties can negotiate this price to balance their interests. A higher subsidy price benefits the government by reducing costs， while a lower price favors the enterprise in terms of profit maximization.（3） On the basis of supply chain coordination， the impacts of factors on both the government and the enterprise are further analyzed. Specifically， as the disaster probability rises and spot market procurement price increases， the cost-benefit outcomes for both parties increase. The government's costs are more sensitive to changes in disaster probability and spot market procurement prices compared to the enterprise’s profits. Additionally， the change of subsidy price can alter the sensitivity of cost-benefit outcomes to these factors. When subsidy prices are low， both parties should closely monitor changes in disaster probability and spot market procurement prices， especially for governments.（4） Comparing subsidy flexibility contracts to quantity flexibility contracts， it is found that the former not only achieves supply chain coordination but also enhances overall cooperation performance by increasing material reserves. By setting reasonable subsidy prices， both the government and the enterprise can achieve win-win cooperation， highlighting the superiority and practical value of contract improvements. As disaster probabilities and spot market procurement prices rise， the advantages of subsidy flexibility contracts become more pronounced. However， this also increases the difficulty of achieving win-win cooperation. Therefore， both parties need to be more cautious in setting subsidy prices under such circumstances.

Key words: emergency material reserve, government-enterprise cooperation, subsidy, contract improvement, supply chain coordination

中图分类号:

D632.5

扈衷权, 沈奥, 李小美, 张宗明. 协议企业储备模式下的应急物资采购储备及补贴策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(7): 243-252.

Zhongquan Hu, Ao Shen, Xiaomei Li, Zongming Zhang. Research on Emergency Material Purchase-reserve and Subsidy under Agreement Enterprise Reserve Mode[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(7): 243-252.

图/表 5

表1

企业补贴柔性契约下的最优物资储备量"

灾害事件发生概率	补贴金额	采购价格	企业储备量
$ρ ≤ c - v m - v$	$0 ≤ s ≤ s t$	$c < e < m$	$q * = 0$
	$s t < s < c - v$	$c < e ≤ e t$	$q * = 0$
	$s t < s < c - v$	$e t < e < m$	$q * = q t$
$ρ > c - v m - v$	$0 ≤ s < c - v$	$c < e ≤ e t$	$q * = 0$
$ρ > c - v m - v$	$0 ≤ s < c - v$	$e t < e < m$	$q * = q t$

表1

图1

图2

图3

图4

参考文献 25

[1]	张玲，高鹏飞，张琳. 基于剥夺成本的应急疏散与物资调配问题研究［J］. 中国管理科学， 2024， 32（5）： 187-195.
	Zhang L， Gao P F， Zhang L. Research on emergency evacuation and material allocation based on deprivation cost［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2024， 32（5）： 187-195.
[2]	董银红，郑琪，李龙. 考虑供应风险的多源应急物资采购双层规划模型［J］. 中国管理科学， 2021， 29（11）： 170-178.
	Dong Y H， Zheng Q， Li L. Bi-level programming model for multi-source emergency materials procurement considering supply risks［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2021， 29（11）： 170-178.
[3]	Gupta S， Starr M K， Farahani R Z， et al. Disaster management from a POM perspective： Mapping a new domain［J］. Production and Operations Management， 2016， 25（10）： 1611-1637.
[4]	单珊. 党的十八大以来我国突发公共卫生事件应急管理体系建设的重大成就和重要经验［J］. 管理世界， 2022， 38（10）： 70-78.
	Shan S. The major achievements and important experience in the construction of China’s emergency management system for public health emergencies since the 18th national congress of the CPC［J］. Journal of Management World， 2022， 38（10）： 70-78.
[5]	张炜健，施先亮，黄安强，等. 重大公共卫生事件下应急药品储备方式优化分配策略［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2022， 42（1）： 110-122.
	Zhang W J， Shi X L， Huang A Q， et al. Optimal allocation policies for emergency medicine reserve methods against major public health events［J］. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice， 2022， 42（1）： 110-122.
[6]	扈衷权，田军，冯耕中. 基于看跌期权契约的应急物资采购储备模型［J］. 中国管理科学， 2020， 28（2）： 69-79.
	Hu Z Q， Tian J， Feng G Z. A procurement and reserve model of emergency supplies based on put option contracts［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2020， 28（2）： 69-79.
[7]	Balcik B， Ak D. Supplier selection for framework agreements in humanitarian relief［J］. Production and Operations Management， 2014， 23（6）： 1028-1041.
[8]	柴亚光，李芃萱. 考虑储备周期的应急物资柔性采购模型［J］. 管理学报， 2021， 18（7）： 1068-1075.
	Chai Y G， Li P X. Flexible procurement model for government’s emergency supplies considering reserve period［J］. Chinese Journal of Management， 2021，18（7）： 1068-1075.
[9]	扈衷权，田军，冯耕中，等. 协议企业代储模式下应急物资储备策略及采购定价研究［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2020， 40（3）： 605-616.
	Hu Z Q， Tian J， Feng G Z， et al. Research on emergency supplies reserve strategy and procurement pricing under agreement enterprise reserve［J］. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice， 2020， 40（3）： 605-616.
[10]	孙翊，吴静，刘昌新，等. 加快推进我国应急物资储备治理体系现代化建设［J］. 中国科学院院刊， 2020， 35（6）： 724-731.
	Sun Y， Wu J， Liu C X， et al. Accelerating construction of innovative country to promote modernization of China’s emergency supplies reserve system［J］. Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences， 2020， 35（6）： 724-731.
[11]	Balcik B， Beamon B M， Krejci C C， et al. Coordination in humanitarian relief chains： Practices， challenges and opportunities［J］. International Journal of Production Economics， 2010， 126（1）： 22-34.
[12]	Kovács G， Spens K M. Humanitarian logistics in disaster relief operations［J］. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management， 2007， 37（2）： 99-114.
[13]	Kovacs G， Spens K M. Knowledge sharing in relief supply chains［J］. International Journal of Networking and Virtual Organisations， 2010， 7（2/3）： 222-239.
[14]	Zhang Y L， Chen L. Emergency materials reserve of government for natural disasters［J］. Natural Hazards， 2016， 81（1）： 41-54.
[15]	Liu F， Song J S， Tong J D. Building supply chain resilience through virtual stockpile pooling［J］. Production and Operations Management， 2016， 25（10）： 1745-1762.
[16]	胡少龙，韩传峰，孟令鹏，等. 考虑企业生产能力储备的应急物资配置随机规划模型［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2018， 38（6）： 1536-1544.
	Hu S L， Han C F， Meng L P， et al. A stochastic programming model for emergency supplies allocation with consideration of production capacity reserves of enterprise［J］. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice， 2018， 38（6）： 1536-1544.
[17]	马新，陈涛，黄钧. 建立全社会应急物资储备体系的若干重要问题［J］. 工程研究-跨学科视野中的工程， 2011， 3（1）： 82-86.
	Ma X， Chen T， Huang J. Several problems on establishing socialized relief storage system［J］. Journal of Engineering Studies， 2011， 3（1）： 86-86.
[18]	陈涛，黄钧，张玲. 协议企业实物储备、生产能力储备模式的协调性研究［J］. 中国管理科学， 2013， 21（5）： 149-156.
	Chen T， Huang J， Zhang L. Research on coordination of the enterprises in-kind agreement physical reserves and production capacity reserves mode［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2013， 21（5）： 149-156.
[19]	扈衷权，田军，冯耕中. 基于数量柔性契约的双源应急物资采购定价模型［J］. 中国管理科学， 2019， 27（12）： 100-112.
	Hu Z Q， Tian J， Feng G Z. The pricing model of emergency supplies under quantity flexible contracts with dual purchasing sources［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2019， 27（12）： 100-112.
[20]	扈衷权，周晓阳，樊慧荣，等. 企业储备模式下应急物资储备及采购定价决策研究［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2023， 43（2）： 438-454.
	Hu Z Q， Zhou X Y， Fan H R， et al. A research on emergency material reserve and purchase pricing decision based on enterprises reserving［J］. Systems Engineering— Theory & Practice， 2023， 43（2）： 438-454.
[21]	扈衷权，张琳，宋妍，等. 考虑损失厌恶偏好的应急物资企业储备模型研究［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2023， 43（5）： 1366-1379.
	Hu Z Q， Zhang L， Song Y， et al. Research on an enterprise reserve model for emergency materials considering loss aversion preference［J］. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice， 2023， 43（5）： 1366-1379.
[22]	John L， Gurumurthy A， Mateen A， et al. Improving the coordination in the humanitarian supply chain： Exploring the role of options contract［J］. Annals of Operations Research， 2022， 319（1）： 15-40.
[23]	Chen J， Liang L， Yao D Q. Pre-positioning of relief inventories：A multi-product newsvendor approach［J］. International Journal of Production Research， 2018， 56（18）： 6294-6313.
[24]	Wang X， Fan Y， Liang L， et al. Augmenting fixed framework agreements in humanitarian logistics with a bonus contract［J］. Production and Operations Management， 2019， 28（8）： 1921-1938.
[25]	Wang Y， Yu Z， Jin M， et al. Decisions and coordination of retailer-led low-carbon supply chain under altruistic preference［J］. European Journal of Operational Research， 2021， 293（3）： 910-925.