能源平台供应链可再生能源电力消纳激励契约研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1461

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

电力行业是我国碳排放的主要来源，发展可再生能源并努力促进可再生能源电力消纳对于实现我国“双碳”目标意义重大。当前由于发电企业和售电企业之间可再生能源电力生产和消纳不平衡，我国仍存在大量弃风弃光等可再生能源电力消纳问题。与此同时，政府对可再生能源的补贴又存在着较大缺口，市场机制尚未充分发挥。本文将电力市场、绿证市场及碳市场视为一个碳电耦合、连接发电企业和售电企业的能源综合市场平台，考虑绿电和绿证分离、半分离及合一三种情形，构建平台最优消纳激励契约，探寻发电企业绿电生产和售电商消纳的最优努力，以及实现可再生能源完全消纳的最优上网价和绿证价。结果显示：（1）不同情形下均存在均衡激励契约，其激励强度满足一定条件时，可激励生产、消纳更多绿电；绿电和火电价格的优化制定可以弥补国家相应的补贴缺口。（2）信息不对称时，平台需要付出额外的信息租金，以激励发电企业和售电商付出和信息对称时相同的可再生能源电力生产和消纳最优努力。（3）绿证价格具有调节可再生能源电力消纳的作用，当绿证价满足某阈值时，可以实现完全消纳。（4）碳排放配额负向影响契约中发电企业的固定收益，而激励性消纳权重正向影响激励契约中售电商的固定收益。

关键词: 能源平台供应链, 消纳责任权重, 绿电发电努力, 消纳努力, 绿证

Abstract:

The electricity sector is responsible for a major share of carbon dioxide emissions， to attach the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals， it is much significant to make renewable energy generation and consumption more effective and efficient. Currently， the consumption of clean electricity needs to be focused， on which there is much renewable power has been curtailed in China， a main reason being the imbalance of renewable power generation and consumption between the generators and electricity retailers. Meanwhile， there is a big gap in the government’s subsidy on renewable power generation， and the mechanism for market regulation performs insufficiently. As the regulations from the government in China， if generators trade renewable power or green certificates corresponding to renewable electricity in the electricity market or tradable green certificate market， the government needs not to offer subsidies to this part of the electricity generated from renewable sources， which is beneficial to alleviate the subsidy pressure of the government， as long as this part of renewable power or green certificates can be consumed in time by power retailers and power consumers. Moreover， if the renewable electricity quantity which the power retailer consumed， is more than the incentive consumption responsibility weight required， the power retailer can trade excess part， which is called excessive consumption in this paper， in the market.Firstly， the electricity market， tradable green certificate market， and carbon quota trading market are considered as an integrated energy trading platform， which couples carbon emissions with electricity， links generators and retailers. It is assumed that the energy platform supply chain in this paper， consists of a generator， an integrated platform， and a power retailer. Three scenarios are considered， including green electricity–green certificate separation， half-separation， and unity， to construct the optimal incentive contract of consumption for the platform. It is explored that the generator’s maximum effort to green power generation and the electricity retailer’s optimal effort to consume. Then， the optimal contract parameters in three scenarios are compared， with data from the electricity trading platform， green certificate trading platform， and carbon trading platform in China， it is investigated that the optimal prices of on-grid green power and tradable green certificate for renewable power being totally consumed. Also， it is analyzed the impacts of carbon emissions allowance， carbon price， and incentive consumption responsibility weight， on renewable power generation and consumption， and on the revenue of players in this platform supply chain. The results show that：（1） There is an equilibrium contract in various conditions， which incentivizes the generator and retailer to generate and consume green electricity as much as possible when their incentive levels got from the platform satisfy a certain constraint， and it is beneficial for the government to narrow the gap of subsidy when optimizing the prices of green electricity and thermoelectricity. （2） Under information asymmetry， the platform needs to pay extra information rents to induce the generator and power retailer to maximize efforts to generate and consume clean power， same as in information symmetry. （3） The price of the tradable green certificate can regulate the uptake of renewable electricity， and the totally consumption on this supply chain can be achieved when the price of the certificate attaches a certain threshold. （4） The generator’s fixed revenue， which got from the platform， is negatively affected by the carbon emissions quota delivered to it， while the fixed revenue of the electricity retailer is positively influenced by the incentive weight of renewable power consumption.With the incentive contracts of the energy trading platform， generators and power retailers can be incentivized to generate and consume more renewable power， which is beneficial to facilitate renewable power subsidies of the government faded out， carbon emissions reduced， and a clean transition of the power sector.

Key words: energy platform supply chain, weight of renewable energy consumption, effort to clean electricity generation, effort to the uptake of renewable power, tradable green certificate

中图分类号:

F224

许书琴, 徐琪. 能源平台供应链可再生能源电力消纳激励契约研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(3): 326-338.

Shuqin Xu, Qi Xu. Incentive Contract of Renewable Energy Power Consumption in Energy Platform Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(3): 326-338.

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