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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (5): 133-146.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0806cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0806

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多渠道零售下考虑消费者反展厅现象的平台型供应链销售模式选择

马德青,王晓晴,胡劲松()   

  1. 青岛大学商学院,山东 青岛 266071
  • 收稿日期:2021-04-23 修回日期:2021-11-06 出版日期:2024-05-25 发布日期:2024-06-06
  • 通讯作者: 胡劲松 E-mail:hujinsong@qdu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72202113);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2023MG063)

Sales Format Selection for Platform-based Supply Chain Considering Consumers' Webrooming Phenomenon in Multi-channel Retailing

Deqing Ma,Xiaoqing Wang,Jinsong Hu()   

  1. School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China
  • Received:2021-04-23 Revised:2021-11-06 Online:2024-05-25 Published:2024-06-06
  • Contact: Jinsong Hu E-mail:hujinsong@qdu.edu.cn

摘要:

在多渠道零售背景下,针对由一个制造商、一个平台型零售商和一个实体零售商构成的平台型供应链,探讨反展厅现象,即消费者在线上渠道获取产品信息后转向线下渠道完成购买的一种交叉渠道行为,对平台最优销售模式选择的影响。文章构建了四种微分博弈模型,分别是存在反展厅现象的转销模式(模型S),无反展厅现象的转销模式(模型NS),存在反展厅现象的代销模式(模型A)以及无反展厅现象的代销模式(模型NA),通过对比四种模式下的制造商质量改进水平、实体店的服务水平、平台型零售商的大数据营销服务水平以及品牌商誉和企业利润,解析分析了反展厅现象的影响。通过数值算例,验证了先前结论,并进一步探讨了平台最优销售模式成立的条件。研究结果表明:当不存在反展厅现象时,平台会在佣金率较低而线上零售价格较高的情况下选择转销模式,而在其他情况下选择代销模式。当反展厅现象存在时,平台还会在佣金率和线上零售价格都很高的时候选择转销,且这个区域会随反展厅现象强度加深而扩大。一个重要结果是,只有当反展厅现象存在时,供应链才有全局占优的销售模式。此外,研究表明,反展厅现象的存在不影响制造商和实体零售商的决策,但会抑制平台提供线上服务的积极性。反展厅现象的存在始终损害平台的利润水平,且随反展厅现象强度加深,平台受损更为严重。实体零售商会从反展厅现象中获利,且随反展厅现象强度加深,利润出现先增后减的情况,当反展厅现象强度中等时,其获利最多。对于制造商而言,反展厅现象强度变化对其的影响要结合平台佣金率和线上零售价格进行分析。

关键词: 反展厅现象, 销售模式, 转销, 代销, 大数据营销

Abstract:

Webrooming, a shopping process in which consumers use online channels to browse product information while completing purchases in offline channels, is an increasingly common type of consumer cross-channel (separation of channels for browsing and purchasing products) behavior in the multi-channel retail environment of the mobile Internet era. According to a report in the 2019 China New Retail White Paper, this webrooming phenomenon is becoming increasingly common, with the product categories in which it occurs involving mother and baby products (39%), skin care and makeup (32%), personal care (32%), alcohol (32%) and cleaning products (31%). Platform companies have also identified in practice the negative impact of this webrooming phenomenon on their sales conversion rates and economic efficiency, and have started to actively adjust their sales models to cope with the increasing retail competition and consumer webrooming behavior. For example, Amazon in the U.S., Taobao in China, and Flipkart in India have adopted a reseller model for most categories of products, while leading U.S. footwear platform Zappos and digital content platforms such as Comcast, Apple's iTunes, and Netflix sell their products through a reseller model. Whereas existing studies have explored platform sales model choice in multiple contexts, the impact of consumer cross-channel behavior, especially the most prevalent webrooming behavior today, on sales models has not been reported, and there has been little discussion of the willingness of other supply chain members to cooperate after the platform has made the optimal sales model choice. To this end, the impact of the webrooming phenomenon on the platform's optimal sales model choice is explored in the context of multichannel retailing for a platform-based supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a platform-based retailer, and a brick-and-mortar retailer. Four differential game models are constructed: reselling model with webrooming (model S), reselling model without webrooming (model NS), reselling model with webrooming (model A) and reselling model without webrooming (model NA). The impact of the webrooming phenomenon is analyzed by comparing the level of quality improvement of manufacturers, the service level of brick-and-mortar stores, the big-data marketing of the platform retailer, and the brand goodwill and corporate profits under the four models. Using numerical examples, our previous findings are validated and the conditions are explored under which the platform-optimal sales model holds true. The results show that when the webrooming phenomenon does not exist, the platform chooses the reselling model when the commission rate is relatively low and the online retail price is relatively high, and the reselling model in other cases. When the webrooming phenomenon is present, the platform also chooses reselling when both commission rates and online retail prices are enough high, and this area widens with the degree of webrooming. An important result is that the supply chain has a globally dominant sales model only when the webrooming phenomenon is present. In addition, it is shown that the presence of the webrooming phenomenon does not affect the decisions of the manufacturer and the brick-and-mortar retailer, but it inhibits the incentive of the platform to offer online services. The presence of the webrooming phenomenon consistently hurts the platform's profitability, and it is more severe as the intensity of the webrooming phenomenon increases. As the intensity of the webrooming phenomenon increases, the brick-and-mortar retailer’s profit first increases and then decreases, with the greatest profits occurring when the intensity of the webrooming phenomenon is moderate. For the manufacturer, the impact of changes in the intensity of the webrooming phenomenon is analyzed in the context of platform commission rates and online retail prices.

Key words: webrooming phenomenon, sales format, reselling, agency selling, big-data marketing

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