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双边市场下网约车平台聚合策略选择研究

曹裕1,李想1,李青松2   

  1. 1. 中南大学商学院
    2. 中南林业科技大学物流与交通学院
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-19 修回日期:2022-09-23 发布日期:2022-10-17
  • 通讯作者: 曹裕

The Integration Strategy Selection of Ride-hailing Platform under the Two-sided Market

  • Received:2022-05-19 Revised:2022-09-23 Published:2022-10-17
  • Contact: Yu Cao

摘要: 以网约车双边市场为背景,结合双边市场理论以及Hotelling模型构建双寡头平台竞争模型,分析一个由聚合平台中的小平台集合(A)与一个大平台(B)的竞争均衡,研究不同网络外部性强度与用户旅行成本下的大平台聚合策略选择问题。理论推导了不聚合策略(N)、跟随策略(F)与开放策略(O)下的双边市场规模决策、定价决策以及定价对用户转移的影响。进一步,通过数值模拟比较不同聚合策略下的大平台利润,发现交叉网络外部性与用户旅行成本是影响大平台聚合策略选择的重要因素。当用户端和司机端交叉网络外部性均低时,大平台不参与聚合,随着外部性上升其选择会从跟随策略转变为开放策略,其中用户端网络外部性对跟随策略、司机端网络外部性对开放策略作用更为显著;当用户旅行成本低于阈值时,大平台采取跟随策略,否则不参与聚合。有趣的是,司机旅行成本和聚合平台抽成比例均不会影响大平台聚合策略选择,可为现实中聚合平台前期的免抽成策略做出解释。

关键词: 双边市场, 网约车平台, 聚合策略, 交叉网络外部性

Abstract: Rapid fragmentation of the ride-hailing market has led to issues like "difficulty in getting a car during peak periods and low user matching rate," for which resource-based businesses like Amap have begun to develop an integration model in which various travel service providers come together on an integrated platform to provide services to customers. Integration models can significantly aid small ride-hailing platform market entry, competition, and profit, however there is some influence from the growth of big platform firms. How to choose the integration approach for ride-hailing platforms is a crucial matter in light of this integration background. Using the two-sided market of ride-hailing as a backdrop, this paper develops a duopoly platform competition model based on the Hotelling model, which includes an integration platform(I) of small platforms(A) and a large platform(B), and investigates the integration strategy selection of large platform in different market environments and user characteristics. In this paper, we theoretically derive the bilateral market size decisions, platform bilateral pricing decisions, and the impact of pricing on customers shifting under the non-integration strategy (N), follow strategy (F), and open strategy (O). Further, numerical simulations are conducted to compare the profit levels of large platforms under different integration strategies. Cross-side network effect and customer’s travel cost are major factors influencing the adoption of large-scale platform integration solutions, according to the findings. Large-scale platforms prefer not to participate in integration when the customer-side and driver-side Cross-side network effects are both low. When the customer’s travel cost is below a certain threshold, the large platform adopts the follow strategy; otherwise, it does not participate in the integration. Interestingly, neither the driver's travel cost nor the commission ratio of the integration platform will affect the choice of large-scale platform integration strategy, which might explain the integration platform's early stage-free development strategy in reality.

Key words: two-sided market, ride-hailing platform, integration strategy, cross-side network effect

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