独立定价还是共同定价:新支付工具的定价策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.02.003

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于新支付工具发展初期市场特征构建双边市场定价模型，分析共同定价和独立定价策略下企业利润和社会福利最大化新支付工具定价。研究显示：政府较企业对新支付工具制定更低价格水平促使用户支付选择转移，特别是在共同定价策略下会有效提升市场效率，达到社会福利最大；但若政府无法做到共同定价，特别在新支付工具成本优势不明显时，会使支付工具间存在过度补贴而降低社会福利，这时企业利润最大化定价为次优选择。

关键词: 支付工具, 双边市场, 定价

Abstract: Payment industry has had a rapid development in recent decades. The appearance of third-party payment means that the innovation of payment instruments has gradually expanded from traditional financial institutions to non-financial institutions, which will lead to different pricing strategies and market development. For both government and payment service provider (called enterprise in the research), there are two pricing strategies-independent pricing strategy and joint pricing strategy. The former strategy means that the enterprise or government makes the prices of new payment instrument to maximize the enterprise profit or the social welfare of new payment instrument, while the latter one refers to that of all payment instruments. Based on the two-sided market theory, new payment instrument pricing models of two pricing strategies are built according to the market characteristics such as market structure, cross network externality in the early development stage of new payment instrument.
The results indicate that the prices of two-sided users of new payment instrument are influenced by the prices of old payment instrument, enterprise's marginal costs of payment instruments and the cross-network externalities. There are often subsidies between payment instruments when the enterprise or government use independent pricing strategy. The independent pricing strategy of enterprise will lead to a lower price level to attract more users of new payment instrument when the old one is profitable, which explains the different pricing strategies phenomena of bank card and third-party payment in their early development stage in China. The independent pricing strategy of government will lead to the lowest social welfare because of the significant subsidies between payment instruments. And the social welfare even could be reduced when the cost advantage of new payment instrument is not obvious compare to the old payment instrument. The results suggest that enterprise profit maximization pricing for new payment instrument is the second best choice when the social planner could not adopt the joint pricing strategy.
The research explains the phenomena in the development of payment market, which also provides theoretical supports for the government to make the related policies.

Key words: payment instrument, two-sided market, pricing

中图分类号:

F830.3

邱甲贤, 雍驰, 童牧. 独立定价还是共同定价:新支付工具的定价策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(2): 19-31.

QIU Jia-xian, YONG Chi, TONG Mu. Independent Pricing or Joint Pricing: Pricing Strategies for New Payment Instruments[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(2): 19-31.

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