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中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 179-187.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.06.019

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

新媒体环境下政府与企业在食品掺假中的演化博弈研究

曹裕1, 余振宇1, 万光羽2   

  1. 1. 中南大学商学院, 湖南 长沙 410083;
    2. 湖南大学经济与贸易学院, 湖南 长沙 410006
  • 收稿日期:2016-03-13 修回日期:2016-11-20 出版日期:2017-06-20 发布日期:2017-08-26
  • 通讯作者: 万光羽(1987-),男(汉族),安徽六安人,湖南大学经济与贸易学院助理教授,研究方向:激励机制设计、供应链管理、医疗系统优化,E-mail:wgy815@gmail.com. E-mail:wgy815@gmail.com.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573281);中南大学创新驱动项目(2016CX040);湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会重大课题(XSP17ZDA011)

Evolutionary Game Study Between Government and Enterprises in Food Adulteration under the New Media Environment

CAO Yu1, YU Zheng-yu1, WAN Guang-yu2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China;
    2. School ofEconomics & Trade, Hunan University, Changsha 410006, China
  • Received:2016-03-13 Revised:2016-11-20 Online:2017-06-20 Published:2017-08-26

摘要: 新媒体对食品安全监管的影响较之传统媒体发生了极大改变,且该影响具有两面性。面对食品企业掺假行为,本文构建非对称演化博弈模型,研究新媒体报道的影响力和真实性两大因素对政府监管机构与食品企业博弈策略选择结果的影响。结论表明,在新媒体塑造的舆论环境下,政府监管机构和食品企业将改变原有的策略选择,高效准确的新媒体监管可以有效约束食品企业的掺假行为,并督促政府尽职监管;若新媒体报道的真实性较低,则不仅会阻碍政府的有效监管,还会让食品企业掺假有可乘之机。因此,政府既要大力发展新媒体也要加强对新媒体的规范和管理。

关键词: 食品安全, 新媒体, 社会共治, 第三方监管, 演化博弈

Abstract: In recent years, the economic benefits driven food adulteration and other food safety incidents happen more and more frequently. Severe food safety issues have become the focus of government and community. However, there are flaws in the single government regulation, social governance, multi-subject joint regulation, which has become the trend of food safety management. Among them, new media as an important power on food safety supervision, the impact of which has been greatly changed compared to the traditional media. Besides the impact has two sides. In this paper, an asymmetric evolutionary game model is constructed. A few parameters are taken into consideration, such as, x0, which is the influence factor of new media reports, t, which is the probability of correct media coverage and so on. In that way, the influence of new media intervention on the strategic choice and game results between the government supervision agencies and the food business behavior can be studied. After model is constructed, the gain matrix is obtained and the result is obtained by solving the dynamic equation. Then combined the range of x0, stability analysis is constructed, that is, analyzing possibility of 4 local equilibrium points becoming ESS. In this process, the focus is on the impact of x0 and t changes on the strategic choice of both sides of the game and its economic significance. Research shows that, new media supervision can effectively restrain the behavior of the food enterprises adulteration, and urge the government due diligence supervision. But if the authenticity of the new media is low, it will not only hinder the effective supervision of the government, but also give opportunity to food enterprises adulteration. Therefore, the government should not only build and develop new media, but also strengthen the standardization and management.

Key words: food safety, newmedia, social governance, third party regulation, evolutionary game

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