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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (6): 70-77.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

不完全信息采购环境下的供应链协调问题： 拍卖机制的应用

马俊, 张杰   

  1. 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院, 北京 100029
  • 收稿日期:2009-01-06 修回日期:2009-11-22 出版日期:2009-12-30 发布日期:2009-12-30
  • 作者简介:马俊(1970- ), 女(汉族), 山东邹平人, 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院, 副教授, 博士, 研究方向:拍卖与招投标、决策分析及供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70401004, 70571014);国家教育部规划资助项目(08JA630015);全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项基金项目(200159);对外经贸大学“211工程”三期重点学科建设项目(33007)

Coordinate Supply Chain via Auction Mechanisms under Procurement with Incomplete Information

MA Jun, ZHANG Jie   

  1. School of Business, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China
  • Received:2009-01-06 Revised:2009-11-22 Online:2009-12-30 Published:2009-12-30

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摘要： 本文研究了不完全信息采购环境下供应链的协调问题.拍卖不仅是一种价格确定机制,它也可以作为一种供应链协调的机制.文献已经证明拍卖机制对于参与方的收益及整条供应链的有效性具有显著影响.本文研究了当市场中存在n个供应商1个买者的情形下,拍卖环境满足独立私人值(IPV)条件、且市场反需求函数为对数函数时,批发价格拍卖、目录拍卖及二部合同拍卖为各方所产生的期望收入,并且证明了批发价格拍卖和目录拍卖不能实现渠道协调,而在拥有信息中介的二部合同拍卖机制下系统可以达到渠道协调.

关键词: 采购拍卖, 供应链协调, 独立私人值

Abstract: This paper examines the problem of supply chain coordination under procurement environment with incomplete information.Auction is not only a price-determination mechanism, it could also serve as a coordination mechanism.Previous works have shown that auction mechanisms could have a significant impact on the players'payoffs and the system efficiency.In this paper, it is studied that how different procurement auction mechanisms influence the players'payoffs, when there are n suppliers and 1 buyer under IPVM settings, and the market inverse demand function is logarithmic.Finally, it is proven that the wholesale price auction and the catalog auction can't realize channel coordination, while only the two-part contract auction with intermediary can achieve channel coordination for the supply chain.

Key words: procurement auction, supply chain coordination, IPV

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