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中国管理科学 ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 280-290.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1748

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产品质量差异下供应链最优区块链平台搭建和加入策略研究

陈晓红1,2, 张维东1, 王傅强1()   

  1. 1.中南大学商学院,湖南 长沙 410083
    2.湖南工商大学前沿交叉学院,湖南 长沙 410205
  • 收稿日期:2022-08-10 修回日期:2023-03-08 出版日期:2025-09-25 发布日期:2025-09-29
  • 通讯作者: 王傅强 E-mail:wfqqfw11@foxmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重大项目(71991460);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972184)

Optimal Blockchain Platform Construction and Joining Strategy of Supply Chain under Product Quality Differentiation

Xiaohong Chen1,2, Weidong Zhang1, Fuqiang Wang1()   

  1. 1.School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China
    2.School of Frontier Crossover Studies,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,China
  • Received:2022-08-10 Revised:2023-03-08 Online:2025-09-25 Published:2025-09-29
  • Contact: Fuqiang Wang E-mail:wfqqfw11@foxmail.com

摘要:

近年来,区块链技术越来越多地应用于供应链运营管理。而区块链的成功运用需要供应链上下游企业共同参与,因此,识别在竞争环境下供应链上下游企业采用区块链技术的条件是一个关键问题。本文构建了由两个上游供应商与一个下游零售商组成的二级供应链,考虑上游供应商存在产品质量差异,研究了零售商与供应商的区块链平台搭建和加入策略。结果表明:上游供应商是否加入区块链平台主要取决于加入区块链的成本,以及采用区块链技术后市场潜力增加的幅度和上游供应商产品质量的差异化水平。当低质量供应商选择加入时,高质量供应商的最优应对策略总是加入区块链平台。上游供应商加入区块链平台并不总是有利于零售商和供应链总利润的增加。特别地,只有当产品竞争强度较小,或上游供应商产品的质量差异较大时,零售商搭建区块链平台才对其更有利。本文研究论证了在供应商竞争环境下企业搭建和加入区块链平台的条件,为企业应用区块链技术提供了决策支持和管理启示。

关键词: 区块链, 供应商竞争, 竞争强度, 产品质量差异

Abstract:

Recently, blockchain technology has been increasingly applied in supply chain operation management. However, the successful implementation of blockchain needs the participation of upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain. Therefore, it is a critical issue to identify the conditions for upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain to adopt blockchain technology in a competitive environment.In this paper, a supply chain that composed of two upstream suppliers with differences in product quality and one downstream retailer is considered. The retailer can choose to build the blockchain platform according to the market situation, and the suppliers can choose to join the blockchain platform. The models for maximizing profits of the suppliers and the retailer are constructed with regard to the retailer does not build a blockchain platform (the suppliers cannot join the blockchain platform) and the retailer builds a blockchain platform (the suppliers choose to join the blockchain platform or do not join the blockchain platform). Then, by solving the models, the optimal decisions of the retailer and the suppliers are obtained in different scenarios. Further, the profits of the retailer and the suppliers are compared to analyze the optimal strategies of the retailer and the suppliers. On this basis, equilibrium results are gotten for the retailer and the suppliers.Several important results are shown through the theoretical analysis. First, whether upstream suppliers join the blockchain platform depends mainly on the cost of blockchain, the increase of market potential after adopting blockchain technology and the differentiation level of product quality of upstream suppliers. Second, when the low-quality supplier decides to join the blockchain platform, the optimal strategy for high quality supplier is to always join the blockchain platform. In the end, upstream suppliers joining the blockchain platform is not always beneficial for retailer and overall supply chain profit. Particularly, only when the production competition intensity is small or the upstream suppliers’ product quality differentiation is significant, it would be better for retailer to construct the blockchain platform. Overall, the research can provide theoretical support for the decision of the retailer to build the blockchain platform in reality, and can also provide theoretical and ideological reference for different types of suppliers to join the blockchain platform.

Key words: blockchain technology, supplier competition, competition intensity, product quality differentiation

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