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中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (10): 106-112.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

混合需求下考虑专利保护因素的闭环供应链定价与协调

曹晓刚1,2, 闻卉3, 郑本荣1, 黎继子1   

  1. 1. 武汉纺织大学管理学院, 湖北 武汉 430073;
    2. 华中科技大学管理学院, 湖北 武汉 430074;
    3. 湖北工业大学理学院, 湖北 武汉 430068
  • 收稿日期:2012-08-11 修回日期:2013-04-30 出版日期:2014-10-20 发布日期:2014-10-20
  • 作者简介:曹晓刚(1982-),男(汉族),山西高平人,武汉纺织大学管理学院副教授,博士,研究方向:供应链管理。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301126);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(1lYJC630011);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2012M511215);湖北省教育厅科学技术研究资助项目(B20l11603);湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究资助项目(20lOQ054,2012G080)

Pricing and Coordination Decision of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Patent Protection Factor under Mixed Demand

CAO Xiao-gang1,2, WEN Hui3, ZHENG Ben-rong1, LI Ji-zi1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Wuhan Textile University, Wuhan 430073, China;
    2. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China;
    3. School of Science, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China
  • Received:2012-08-11 Revised:2013-04-30 Online:2014-10-20 Published:2014-10-20

摘要: 在新产品需求为随机需求,再制造产品需求受销售价格影响的混合需求条件下,以博弈论为主要工具,研究了受专利保护的再制造闭环供应链的定价与协调问题,分析了集中决策和分散决策两种情形下的新产品最优订购量、废旧产品最优回收价格、最优专利许可费用、再制造品最优零售价格以及供应链的最优利润,并通过收益分享一费用分担契约对闭环供应链系统进行了协调,并通过数值算例验证了集中决策和分散决策情形下再制造成本节约对供应链成员的最优决策和利润的影响,以及收益分享.费用分担契约对闭环供应链的协调效果。研究表明再制造受专利保护的情况下,原制造商能通过专利许可费来影响第三方再制造商回收的废旧产品的回收价格和回收量,进而去影响原制造商和第三方再制造商的收益。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 混合需求, 专利保护, 协调

Abstract: In this paper, the pricing and coordination problem of the patent-protected remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under mixed demand of stochastic new products' demand and remanufactured products' price-dependent demand is studied using game theory. Through the analysis of two circumstances of centralized and decentralized decision-making, the optimal ordering quantity and wholesale price of new products, the optimal recycling price of waste products, the optimal patent licensing fees, the optimal retail price of remanufactured products and the optimal profit of the supply chain are obtained. Furthermore, the supply chain is coordinated by using revenue and expense sharing contract. Through the numerical example the impact of different remanufacturing cost saving on the optimal decision and the profits of the supply chain members, and the coordinating effect of the revenue and expense sharing contract are abtained. It can found that the manufacturer can influence the recycling price and recycling quantity of the used products recycled by the third re-manufacturer in the case of patent-protected remanufacturing, and then affect the revenue of manufacturer and the thirdre-manufacturer.

Key words: close-loop supply chain, mixed demand, patent protection, coordination

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