带保修期的寿命型产品多属性招标采购机制设计——以大型医疗设备为例

中国管理科学 ›› 2013, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (4): 112-120.

带保修期的寿命型产品多属性招标采购机制设计——以大型医疗设备为例

马本江, 徐笔武, 徐晨

中南大学商学院, 湖南长沙 410083

收稿日期:2011-05-18 修回日期:2012-12-03 出版日期:2013-08-30 发布日期:2013-08-24
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金委创新群体资助项目(70921001);国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71072078);国家自然科学基金青年资助项目(71103203);湖南省人文社会科学基金(12YBA331);中南大学人文社科杰出青年人才基金(2011RWSK008)

Multi-attribute Bidding Mechanism Design for Warranted Lifetime Products：A case study on Large Medical Equipments

MA Ben-jiang, XU Bi-wu, XU Chen

School of Business,Central South University, Changsha 410083, China

Received:2011-05-18 Revised:2012-12-03 Online:2013-08-30 Published:2013-08-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 产品的期望寿命是重要的质量属性之一,事前不可观察且不可验证,直接对该质量属性进行投标没有意义。针对此问题,以大型寿命型医疗设备招标采购为例,利用拍卖机制设计理论建立了一类具有信号传递功能的多属性招标采购模型。模型确定了最优投标规则,包括设备最优期望寿命投标、最优保修期投标与最优价格支付。模型确立了甄别投标企业技术类型与传递产品质量可靠性信息的机制。研究结果表明:首先该机制满足参与约束与激励相容约束,投标企业分别按自身期望利润最大化进行投标;其次该最优机制能保证企业承诺的保修期与期望寿命正相关,能保证技术类型最高、所提供产品期望寿命最大(保修期最长)的企业中标,并且中标企业创造相对来说最高的社会福利。构造一个算例说明新的多属性招标采购机制在实践中易于操作,是可实施的。当质量指标存在不可观察和不可验证的维度时,相关研究为解决多属性招标采购问题提供了一个新思路。

关键词: 保修期, 多属性, 招标采购, 信号传递, 机制设计

Abstract: For the life expectancy of single major medical equipment cannot be observed or verified and it is one of the key quality indicators,it has no meaning to directly bid for this quality attribute. To this problem, warranty is introduced into bidding mechanism of hospital procurement as an important decision variable, and a new multi-attribute bidding model with signal transduction function is established based on the auction mechanism design theory. The optimal bidding rules, including best bid for equipment life expectancy,best bid for equipment warranty, and the best price to pay is defined in the model. A mechanism that could identify enterprises' technology types and transmit information about product quality reliability is also established. The results show that: firstly, this mechanism satisfied participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint.In other words, bidding enterprises can bid for the maximal profits separately according to their own expectations;Secondly, this optimal mechanism ensures a positive correlation between life expectancy and warranty that enterprises committed. It also ensures enterprises, which are the highest technical types and provide maximum product life expectancy (warranty period the longest), win the bidding. It also ensure the successful company create a relatively highest social welfare. A example is used to illustrate the new mechanism which is enforceable and easy to operate. A new idea when the quality dimension can not be observed and verified is provided by the research.

Key words: warranty, multi-attributes, bidding, signal transmission, mechanism design

中图分类号:

F724.59

马本江, 徐笔武, 徐晨. 带保修期的寿命型产品多属性招标采购机制设计——以大型医疗设备为例[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(4): 112-120.

MA Ben-jiang, XU Bi-wu, XU Chen. Multi-attribute Bidding Mechanism Design for Warranted Lifetime Products：A case study on Large Medical Equipments[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, 21(4): 112-120.

参考文献

[1] McAfee R P, McMillan J.Auctions and Bidding[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1987,25(2):699-738.
[2] Hansen.Auctions with endogenous quantity[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, 19(1):44-48.
[3] Bellosta M J, Brigui I,Kornman S, et al. A multicriteria model for electronic auctions[C].Proceedirgs of ACM Symposium on Applied Computing Niscosia, Cyprus, March 14-17,2004.
[4] Thiel S E.Multidimensional auctions[J].Economics Letters,1988, 28(3): 37-40.
[5] Pepall L M, Richards D J. Reach for the stars:a strategic bidding game[J].Economica,2001,68(1):489-504.
[6] Martinez De Albeniz V, Simchi Levi D.Competition in the supply option market[J].Operations Research, 2009,57(5):1082-1097.
[7] Che Y K.Design competition through multidimensional auctions[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(4):668-680.
[8] Branco F.The design of multidimensional auctions[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1997,28(1):63-81.
[9] David E, Azouloy-Schwartz A, Krous S. An English Auction Protocol for Multi-attribute Items[C].Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2002,2531:52-68.
[10] David E. Bidding in Sealed-bid and English Multi-attribute Auctions[J]. Dexision Support Systems Journal 2006,42(2):5237-556.
[11] Beil D R, Wein L M.An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process[J].Management Science,2003,49(11):1529-1545.
[12] Asker J, Cantillon E.Equilibrium in scoring auctions. Working paper no 2004. 148, Fonda zione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2004.
[13] De Smet Y.Multicriteria auctions without full comparability of bids[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,177(33):1433-1452.
[14] 王先甲, 韩东, 殷红, 等.区域配电服务特许经营权竞标机制设计[J].中国电机工程学报,2006,26(20):39-44.
[15] 黄河,陈剑,徐鸿雁.多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制设计研究[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(1):104-110.
[16] 黄河,陈剑,徐鸿雁.组合采购拍卖的多因素投标机制设计研究[J].中国软科学,2008,7:134-140.
[17] 黄河,徐鸿雁,陈剑.基于拍卖谈判的多因素多物品采购机制设计[J].系统工程学报,2009,24(3):315-321.
[18] 黄河,徐鸿雁,陈剑.多因素采购组合拍卖获胜者确定问题研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,7:27-33.
[19] 孙亚辉,冯玉强.多属性密封拍卖模型及最优投标策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2010,30(7):1185-1189.
[20] 王宏,陈宏民,杨剑侠.多维信息招投标中的最优机制及其实施[J].管理科学学报,2010,12(8):1-14.
[21] 殷红.几类特性物品的拍卖机制设计理论及方法研究[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005:72-86.
[22] 《运筹学》教材编写组编.运筹学[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005.
[23] Maskin E S, Riley J G. Optimal multi-unit auctions[M].//Hahn F. The eonomies of missing markets, inofmration, and games. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press,1989:312-335.
[24] Myerson R. Optimal auction design[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,1981,12(6):58-73.