突发事件下考虑政府限价政策的生鲜供应链应急产品投放策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0186

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

针对突发事件造成生鲜农产品供给缺损时政府如何通过零售商实施应急产品的投放问题，考虑政府提供应急产品并制定限价政策，构建无应急产品投放和应急产品投放时供应链的多阶段博弈模型，研究了政府限价下生鲜供应链的应急产品投放策略，分析了应急产品投放对市场供给和价格、消费者剩余和社会福利以及生鲜供应链利润等的影响。研究表明：当应急产品的批发价格相对较低且政府限价较高时，政府可以通过零售商实现对应急产品的有效投放；应急产品的投放总是能够对市场起到保供稳价的作用，且政府的限价约束能够增强其保供稳价的效果；应急产品的投放能够改善消费者剩余和社会福利，且在一定限价条件下还会促进零售商和上游供应商的利润改善，带来“多方共赢”的局面。

关键词: 生鲜农产品供应链, 政府限价, 应急投放, 保供稳价

Abstract:

In recent years， the frequent occurrence of emergencies has brought severe challenges to the supply and price stability in the fresh produce market， causing supply shortages and price fluctuations of fresh produce and damaging the interests of consumers. In this context， the government may rely on the retailer to release emergency-used fresh produce that has been reserved in advance （briefly， emergency products） to the market. To stabilize market supply and price better， the government will also set a price limit for emergency products. However， the retailer may be reluctant to purchase and sell emergency products because they are not profitable or may damage its own profit under a price limit， which will affect the effective release of emergency products and consumers’ living security. Therefore， it is necessary to analyze whether the retailer will actively release emergency products under the government’s price limit policy and how the government sets the price limit to promote the effective release of emergency products.The above problem is discussed in the following three parts. First， considering that the government provides the emergency products and sets a price limit， a multi-stage game model of the fresh produce supply chain is constructed when the emergency products are released or not released， and the optimal decisions and profits of supplier and retailer are analyzed. On this basis， the release strategy of emergency products in the supply chain is discussed， and the government’s price limit policy to promote the effective release of emergency products is explored. Third， the effects of emergency products’ release on the price and supply of fresh produce， consumer surplus， social welfare， and the profits of supply chain members are explored. Finally， through numerical analysis， the model is tested and management inspiration is provided， which offers guidance for the government to tackle supply risks and provides theoretical support for market members’ decision-making under the government’s price limit policy.The results indicate that the government can rely on the retailer to release the emergency products to the market by setting a relatively high price limit. The release of the emergency product can always exert the effectiveness of stabilizing supply and price for fresh produce， and the effectiveness is more significant when the price limit is lower， the yield for fresh produce is higher， and the freshness difference between emergency products and fresh produce is smaller. The release of the emergency product can improve consumer surplus and social welfare. Under a certain price limit， it will also promote the supplier’s and retailer’s profit improvement and bring about an “all-win” situation. It is also shown that there exists an optimal price-limit level to maximize social welfare， and when fresh produce has a higher yield， the optimal price-limit level is higher. Finally， even if the sale of emergency products becomes an “unprofitable business”， the retailer may introduce emergency products， prompting the supplier to reduce the wholesale price of fresh produce， thereby increasing its overall profit.

Key words: fresh produce supply chain, price limit, release of emergency products, stability of supply and price

中图分类号:

雷婷, 但斌, 马崧萱, 田宇. 突发事件下考虑政府限价政策的生鲜供应链应急产品投放策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(4): 213-223.

Ting Lei, Bin Dan, Songxuan Ma, Yu Tian. Release of Emergency Products in Fresh Produce Supply Chain Considering the Government’ s Price Limit Policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(4): 213-223.

图/表 5

表1

供应链各主体的利润变化"

区域	满足条件	利润变化
RI	$p ¯ ≥ p ¯ 0$ 且 $w g < w 2$	$Δ π r > 0$ ， $Δ π s < 0$ ， $Δ π s c > 0$
RII	$p ¯ 4 < p ¯ < m i n (p ¯ 0, p ¯ 1)$	$Δ π r > 0$ ， $Δ π s < 0$ ， $Δ π s c > 0$
RIII	$p ¯ 3 < p ¯ ≤ p ¯ 4$	$Δ π r > 0$ ， $Δ π s < 0$ ， $Δ π s c < 0$
RIV	$λ < 8 / 9$ 、 $w g ≥ w 3$ 且 $p ¯ 3 < p ¯ < p ¯ 1$	$Δ π r > 0$ ， $Δ π s ≥ 0$ ， $Δ π s c > 0$

表1

图1

图2

图3

表2

零售商的公益性投放区间"

参数设置	无应急产品投放情形	应急产品投放情形
$c = 0.25$ ， $γ = 0.6$ ， $λ = 0.8$	$π r S N = 0.0213$	$p g = w g$	0.480	0.490	0.500
$c = 0.25$ ， $γ = 0.6$ ， $λ = 0.8$	$π r S N = 0.0213$	$π r D L$	0.0217	0.0233	0.0250
$c = 0.25$ ， $γ = 0.6$ ， $λ = 0.6$	$π r S N = 0.0213$	$p g = w g$	0.400	0.420	0.440
$c = 0.25$ ， $γ = 0.6$ ， $λ = 0.6$	$π r S N = 0.0213$	$π r D L$	0.0230	0.0254	0.0280
$c = 0.25$ ， $γ = 0.8$ ， $λ = 0.8$	$π r S N = 0.0295$	$p g = w g$	0.425	0.435	0.445
$c = 0.25$ ， $γ = 0.8$ ， $λ = 0.8$	$π r S N = 0.0295$	$π r D L$	0.0305	0.0325	0.0345

表2

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