回收模式相异的零售商主导型闭环供应链竞争模型研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.04.008

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 随着经济全球化的推进，同行业竞争已逐渐由企业间的竞争转化为供应链间的竞争。在此背景下，本文围绕MR、MT和RT三种相异的回收模式组合，构建了两条零售商主导型闭环供应链的竞争博弈模型，运用逆向归纳法得到三种回收模式组合下各条链的均衡价格、回收率、渠道成员利润、单条链利润与双链总利润，然后结合链间竞争强度将不同回收模式组合的结果进行比较，研究表明：（1）在三种回收模式组合下，链间竞争强度的增加将使批发价、零售价与回收率均提高，市场需求量增大，各渠道成员的收益均得到改善，但却损害了消费者利益；（2）MR与MT组合下四条链的产品售价、单链回收率、制造商利润、零售商利润与单链总利润排序均与链间竞争强度无关，而RT组合两条链的变量均衡解、利润与MR、MT组合的数量关系与链间竞争强度密切相关；（3）对于两条竞争性闭环供应链的任一条链，若其竞争链是制造商回收链（零售商回收链），则在选择相异回收模式时，从整条链利润视角其应形成零售商回收链（制造商回收链）；若其竞争链是第三方回收链，当双链竞争不是极为剧烈时，其应形成制造商回收链，否则应形成零售商回收链；（4）当链间竞争较平稳时，MR组合的双链总利润优于MT组合和RT组合；随着双链竞争强度的增加，RT组合的双链总利润将依次超过MT组合与MR组合；当链间竞争特别激烈时，MR组合甚至低于MT组合。故链间竞争强度的增加对RT组合两条链具有最显著的积极影响，而对MR组合的影响则较为有限。本文研究不仅拓展了闭环供应链竞争理论，而且能够为现实中处于链与链竞争环境下的企业选择合理的回收模式提供理论支持。

关键词: 再制造, 相异回收模式, 零售商主导, 闭环供应链竞争

Abstract: With the development of economic globalization, competition in the same industry has gradually transformed from competition among enterprises into competition among supply chains. In this context, game models of two competitive retailer-led closed loop supply chains (CLSCs) are studied under three kinds of combinations of collection modes:MR combination, MT combination and RT combination. The equilibrium prices, collection rates, profits of channel members, single chain profits and total profits of two chains under three combinations are derived based on backward induction method. The results of six chains in three combinations are compared by mathematical derivation and numerical examples. The conclusions show that:(1) the increase of the competition intensity makes the retail prices, the collection rates and the market demand increase, and improves the profits of all the chain members. However, it does harm to consumer interests; (2) the orders of selling prices, collection rates, manufacturers' profits, retailers' profits and chain's profits in four chains of MR and MT combinations are irrelevant with the competition intensity between two chains; in contrast, the competition intensity does affect the relations between the equilibrium solutions and manufacturers' and retailers' profits of RT combination and those in MR and MT combination. (3) For either of the two chains, if its competitive chain is manufacturer-collection (retailer-collection), it should form a retailer-collection (manufacturer-collection) chain from the perspective of chain's profit under different collection modes; if its competitive chain is third-party-collection, it should form a manufacturer-collection chain when the competition intensity is lower than a specific threshold, otherwise it should form a retailer-collection one. (4) If the competition between the two chains is moderate, the total profit of the two chains in MR combination is higher than that in MT or RT combination due to its higher collection efficiency; however, when the competition intensity increases gradually, the total profit of the two chains in RT combination will exceed those in RT and MR combination one by one; when the competition between the two chains are extremely fierce, the total profit in MR combination is even lower than that in MT combination. Therefore, the fierce competition has the greatest positive effect on the two chains in RT combination, but has the least positive effect on MR combination. The above conclusions enrich the theory of CLSC competition and can help the manufacturers choose the appropriate collection modes in practice in a chain-to-chain competition environment.

Key words: remanufacturing, different collection modes, retailer-led, competitive closed loop supply chains

中图分类号:

F274

孙浩, 王磊, 李晨, 胡劲松, 钟永光, 达庆利. 回收模式相异的零售商主导型闭环供应链竞争模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(4): 86-98.

SUN Hao, WANG Lei, LI Chen, HU Jin-song, ZHONG Yong-guang, DA Qing-li. Research on Game Models of Competitive Retailer-led Closed Loop Supply Chains with Different Collection Modes[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(4): 86-98.

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