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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (5): 98-108.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1211

• 论文 • 上一篇    

股权融资下企业市场竞争策略选择的模型研究

王宇1, 翟佳1, 邓杰2   

  1. 1. 重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054; 2.重庆工商大学会计学院,重庆400067
  • 收稿日期:2019-08-15 修回日期:2020-06-10 发布日期:2022-06-01
  • 通讯作者: 王宇(1988-),男(汉族),重庆永川人,重庆理工大学管理学院,讲师,博士,研究方向:供应链金融、股权融资、债转股,Email: wangyu8611@126.com. E-mail:wangyu8611@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    重庆市社会科学规划项目(2019BS066);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(19YJC630026);重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究规划项目(19SKGH131);重庆理工大学国家自然科学基金和社会科学基金资助项目培育计划项目;重庆理工大学科研启动基金资助项目

Model Research on Competition Strategy Choice of Enterprises under Equity Financing

WANG Yu1, ZHAI Jia1, DENG Jie2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China;2. School of Accountancy, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
  • Received:2019-08-15 Revised:2020-06-10 Published:2022-06-01
  • Contact: 王宇 E-mail:wangyu8611@126.com

摘要: 企业市场竞争策略的制定不仅应考虑竞争双方运营层面的因素,还应重视其资本运作带来的影响。本文构建了零售商采取股权融资进行市场开拓的市场竞争模型,探讨其市场竞争策略选择及其影响因素。研究发现:零售商的市场竞争策略取决于其成长性和市场开拓的外部性;提高成长性或外部性均能促进企业的股权融资,而企业原股东的委托代理行为会抑制股权融资,并影响其市场开拓决策,但不会定性改变企业的价格竞争策略。此外,当市场开拓呈现负外部性时,竞争者应采取相应措施以避免掉入“融资企业成长性陷阱”。

关键词: 市场竞争;市场开拓;股权融资;委托代理

Abstract: The formulation of market competition strategy of enterprise should not only focus on the operational factors of both competitors, but also consider the influence of its capital operation. However, the literature has focused on the interaction between market competition and debt financing, but been silent on the effect of equity financing on market competition. Present study considers two Bertrand retailers, in which one retailer faces good market opportunity and employs equity financing to exploit the market. Its demand function becomes D1=a1-b1p1+γ1p2+β1e, where β1and e represent its growth and effort, respectively. The market development will directly influence the demand of its competitor and change it to D2=a2-b2p2+γ2p1+β2e, where β2 is called as externality of market development. The valuation of financing retailer is set as V, so the equity of its shareholders changes to V/(V+B). Based on these, a Bertrand competition model is constructed under equity financing, and the competition strategy choice and its influencing factors are investigated, such as the principal-agent behavior of shareholders. Additionally, a numerical simulation whose parameters are partly based on the data of Chinese stock market is also present to clearly reveal the competition strategy choice. Core research indicates that retailer’s competition strategy depends on its growth as well as externality of market development. Increasing the growth or enhancing the externality are both able to promote the equity financing of the retailer, while the principal-agent behavior of shareholders could impede it. Additionally,this behavior has effect on the market development decision, though the price competition strategy would not be qualitatively changed. Moreover, the competitor must take actions to avoid falling into the “growth trap of financing enterprise” under negative externality. The results not only contribute to the competition strategy choice of growth enterprise and the exploration of the interaction between market competition and equity financing, but also provide insight into the model research of equity financing from the perspective of enterprise operation.

Key words: market competition; market development; equity financing; principal-agent

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