关系租金分配的实现方法及其优化

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0497

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 77-87.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0497

关系租金分配的实现方法及其优化

史文雷^1,2, 阮平南¹, 魏云凤³, 刘晓燕¹

1. 北京工业大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100124;
2. 山东财经大学会计学院, 山东济南 250014;
3. 北京工业大学城市交通学院, 北京 100124

收稿日期:2019-04-11 修回日期:2019-11-08 出版日期:2021-05-20 发布日期:2021-05-26
通讯作者: 史文雷(1979-),男(汉族),山东日照人,北京工业大学经济与管理学院,博士,山东财经大学会计学院,讲师,研究方向:管理理论与方法应用,E-mail:swenlei@126.com. E-mail:swenlei@126.com.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71974009，71371018）；山东省重点研发计划（2020RKB01367）

Implementation Method and Optimization of Relational Rent Distribution

SHI Wen-lei^1,2, RUAN Ping-nan¹, WEI Yun-feng³, LIU Xiao-yan¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China;
2. School of Accountancy, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China;
3. College of Metropolitan Transportation, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China

Received:2019-04-11 Revised:2019-11-08 Online:2021-05-20 Published:2021-05-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究网络组织产生的关系租金如何分配给网络组织成员的问题。首先，构建网络组织运行的功能模型，系统化分析关系租金的生成过程，从而设计关系租金分配的总体方案；其次，针对关系租金生成的事前、事中和事后三个阶段，分析其影响因素，从而提出有针对性的关系租金分配方法，并设计以上分配方法的集成与修正算法；再次，基于网络组织的稳定性分析和共有利益和私有利益之间分配的平衡，提出了关系租金分配的优化方法；证明了以上分配方法的合理性，最后通过算例验证了分配方法的可行性和实用性。

关键词: 关系租金, 网络组织, 租金分配, 稳定性

Abstract: The stability is the basic condition to ensure sustainable development of network organization, relational rent distribution is the core element to ensure stability, and relational rent distribution design is the key to realize scientific distribution.The objective of this paper is to provide a method that can be utilized to distribute relational rent to the members of a network organization. Firstly, the function model of network organization operation is constructed, the relational rent generation process is systematically analyzed, and the overall plan of relational rent distribution is designed. Secondly, analyzing the influencing factors, three-stage allocation method for relational rent is proposed, and the integration and modification algorithms of the above allocation methods are designed. Thirdly, based on the stability analysis of network organization, the optimization stage identifies methods for considering the fundamental stability requirements of network organizations based on the proportions of common benefits and private benefits, network organizational stability is also discussed and the optimized distribution method for relational rent is proposed. The summary steps and case analysis stages summarize the rent distribution flow chart and discuss the usefulness of the methods to participants for generating conclusions. This rent distribution method clearly demonstrates the need to easily allocate all types of network organizations and it emphasizes facilitating distribution, proving the rationality of the method. The feasibility and rationality of the distribution method are verified by an example.

Key words: relational rent, network organization, rent distribution, stability

中图分类号:

F270

史文雷, 阮平南, 魏云凤, 刘晓燕. 关系租金分配的实现方法及其优化[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(5): 77-87.

SHI Wen-lei, RUAN Ping-nan, WEI Yun-feng, LIU Xiao-yan. Implementation Method and Optimization of Relational Rent Distribution[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(5): 77-87.

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关系租金分配的实现方法及其优化

Implementation Method and Optimization of Relational Rent Distribution

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