平台模式下农民合作社与供应链协调研究——以农户主导视角

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1830

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对众创平台模式下农民专业合作社与供应链协调问题。在农地流转背景下提出了一种农户主导供应链的多阶段斯坦科尔伯格博弈模型，设计了一种集中决策模式和四种分散决策模式，考虑了风险传递、决策优先权、边际成本和风险成本问题，构建了农场主、合作社、小农户和平台以农户数量（或合作比例）、土地流转收益、增产率和期望销售目标等共同影响的利润最大化模型，得到了最优土地流转收益和最大化利润所满足的方程；发现农户数量（或合作比例）、收益分配率、销售目标等因素都会对最优解产生影响。通过数值模拟，发现农场主（或合作社）优先权可以提高农场主（或合作社）利润；在一定条件下，合作社模式可以实现供应链协调；在农场主（或合作社）模式中平台和小农户利润通常是较低的；在供应链协调和小农户利润不降低的前提下，可以通过有效途径对平台利润差额进行补偿以保证合作社模式持续均衡。

关键词: 农地流转, 合作社, 风险流, 供应链协调

Abstract: The relationship of farmers and farmland has been weakened by the development of rural economy, the increase of non-farm income and the promotion of new rural construction, which not only promotes the transfer of farmland, but also provides a living space for the development of cooperatives. To build the development model of rural industry integration is an effective way to let farmers share the value added of the industry. Aiming at the problem of farmers' cooperative and supply chain coordination under the model of platform, a multistage Stackelberg Game model of farmer leading has been proposed under the background of farmland transfer, and a centralized decision-making model and four decentralized decision-making models have been designed. Risk transfer, decision priorities, marginal costs and risk costs are considered, profits maximization models of farmers, cooperatives, small farmers and platforms have been constructed, which were influenced by factors, such as the number of farmers (or the proportion of cooperation), the revenue of farmland transfer, the rate of increase in production, and the sales goals. The functions of optimal revenue of farmland transfer and maximum profits were obtained, and it was found that the number of farmers (or the proportion of cooperation), the revenue sharing rate, and the sales goals all had impacts on the optimal solution. Through numerical simulation, some conclusions are shown. Large farmer's(or cooperatives') priority can increase large farmer's(or cooperatives') profits; Under certain conditions, the cooperative model can achieve supply chain coordination; In the large farmer(or cooperative) model, platform and small farmers' profits are usually lower than those of other models; When the supply chain is coordinated and the profits of small farmers are not reduced, the platform's profits loss can be compensated through an effective way to ensure the continuous equilibrium of the cooperative model.

Key words: farmland transfer, cooperative, risk flow, supply chain coordination

中图分类号:

F272
F324

胡玉凤, 丁友强, 孙元欣. 平台模式下农民合作社与供应链协调研究——以农户主导视角[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(5): 88-96.

HU Yu-feng, DING Yong-qiang, SUN Yuan-xin. Farmers' Cooperative and Supply Chain Coordination under Platform Model——from the Perspective of Farmer Leading[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(5): 88-96.

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