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中国管理科学 ›› 2018, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (1): 179-185.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.01.018

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于隐形契约的集群企业知识共享伙伴选择研究

韩莹, 陈国宏   

  1. 福州大学经济与管理学院, 福建 福州 350116
  • 收稿日期:2015-06-30 修回日期:2017-09-28 发布日期:2018-03-19
  • 通讯作者: 陈国宏(1953-),男(汉族),福建福州人,福州大学经济与管理学院,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:科技管理,E-mail:cgh@fcu.edu.cn. E-mail:cgh@fcu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(15FGL005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71403052,71403055);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2015M570155,2016T90140);福州大学经济与管理学院管理科学与工程研究院高水平建设经费项目资助(0490-521137)

Research of Knowledge Sharing Partner Selection in Cluster Enterprises Based on Invisible Contract

HAN Ying, CHEN Guo-hong   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, China
  • Received:2015-06-30 Revised:2017-09-28 Published:2018-03-19

摘要: 产业集群中隐性契约的存在抑制了集群合作中机会主义行为的产生,使得集群企业间的知识共享合作比一般企业更具有稳定性。本文基于产业集群隐形契约约束,根据Hotelling博弈模型,分阶段对集群企业间知识共享伙伴的选择机制进行研究。研究表明,早期建立更为广泛的知识共享伙伴合作关系对集群企业的长远发展较为有利,集群企业总是更愿意与网络权力较大的企业形成知识共享关系,隐形契约的约束有利于产业集群建立更为稳定的知识共享关系网络,提升集群企业知识收益,有助于产业集群的良性发展。

关键词: 产业集群, 知识共享, 合作伙伴, Hotelling博弈

Abstract: The existence of cluster invisible contracts control the opportunism behavior occurring in the cooperation of industrial cluster enterprises, and make the knowledge sharing cooperation between cluster enterprises be more stability than the other general enterprises. Due to the industrial cluster invisible contract, the enterprises which betray the original knowledge sharing partners will get punishment. In this paper, based on the cluster invisible contract background, a Hoteling game model is constructed to analyze the mechanism of industrial cluster invisible contract to the partner selection of cluster enterprise knowledge sharing behavior. The model is divided into two stages to explore the cluster enterprise knowledge sharing partner selection in decision-making behavior. Specifically, in the first stage, the cluster enterprises can choose the knowledge sharing partners arbitrary, but in the second stage, without the continuation of the first phase of the choice, the cluster enterprise will receive the punishment of the invisible contract in industrial cluster. The results shown that (1) building a broader knowledge sharing partnership in the early stage is good for the long-term development of enterprise, so for the new enterprises into the cluster, establish quality and extensive network connections should be in the first place; (2)the cluster enterprises always prefer to establish knowledge sharing relations with the enterprises which have the greater cluster power. Therefore, when the cluster enterprises establish a new contact with other nodes, they can give priority to the core enterprises in the cluster, and the local government should also strengthen for the cultivation of cluster core enterprise; (3) the invisible contract constraint is helpful to establish a more stable relationship about knowledge sharing network of industrial cluster, which can improve the knowledge revenue of cluster enterprise, and contribute the benign development of industrial cluster.So in the development of the cluster, the invisible contract of industry cluster should be consoidated and developed. For the specialty of industrial cluster, the influence of cluster invisible contract on cluster enterprise knowledge sharing activities, and beneficial enlightenment is provied for industrial cluster knowledge management practice.

Key words: industrial cluster, knowledge sharing, cooperative partners, Hotelling game

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