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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (11): 88-95.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.11.009

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府监管与隐形契约共同作用下集群企业创新合作的演化博弈研究

韩莹1, 陈国宏2   

  1. 1. 福建师范大学经济学院, 福建 福州 350117;
    2. 阳光学院商学院, 福建 福州 350015
  • 收稿日期:2018-06-30 修回日期:2019-08-17 出版日期:2019-11-20 发布日期:2019-11-28
  • 通讯作者: 陈国宏(1953-),男(汉族),福建福州人,阳光学院商学院,教授,博士,博士生导师,研究方向:科技管理,E-mail:cgh@fzu.edu.cn. E-mail:cgh@fzu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目（19BGL031）；全国中国特色社会主义政治经济学研究中心（福建师范大学）资助项目（Q201803）

Three-party Evolutionary Game of Cluster Enterprises Innovation Cooperation based on Government Supervision and Implicit Contract

HAN Ying1, CHEN Guo-hong2   

  1. 1. School of Economics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350117, China;
    2. Business School, Yango University, Fuzhou 350015, China
  • Received:2018-06-30 Revised:2019-08-17 Online:2019-11-20 Published:2019-11-28

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摘要： 考虑政府监管下的正式契约与非正式组织监管下的隐形契约对集群企业间创新合作的约束作用，运用演化博弈方法，建立政府、非正式组织与集群企业的非对称博弈模型，分析了三方参与主体的演化稳定策略，并运用数值仿真分析进一步验证博弈研究。研究结果表明：无论是政府的正式规章制度还是非正式的集群隐形契约，都能够对集群企业的合作创新产生良好的约束作用，其中正式规章制度相较于隐形契约的约束强度更大，并且在集群发展初期对集群企业间的创新合作行为起到重要约束作用，而隐形契约对集群企业的约束效果更加稳定持久。通过探究集群企业创新合作的行为过程，进一步了解产业集群的监管与约束机制，以推动我国产业集群的转型升级，引导集群企业间的创新合作，增强我国产业发展的核心竞争力。

关键词: 产业集群, 隐形契约, 创新合作, 演化博弈

Abstract: In the perfection of market economy system in China, enterprise opportunism behavior in cooperation is relatively common due to lack of enough good faith.However, the enterprises within the industry cluster have been paid much attention because of the less opportunism behavior and innovation cooperation advantages.The reason is that in the development of mature industrial clusters, cluster enterprises often affected by the cluster informal contract in addition to the formal contract by market mechanism. Consider the formal regulation and informal contract of cluster innovation cooperation between enterprises, the evolutionary game method is used to establish the tripartite asymmetric game model among government, informal organization and cluster enterprises, to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy of the three parties, and numerical simulation analysis is used for further validation research. The results show that, both the government's formal regulation and the informal cluster contractwill be able to produce good constraints to cluster enterprise cooperative innovation.Specially, government formal regulation has the more intensive constraint than the informal contract and plays an important role in cluster enterprise cooperation at the beginning of the cluster development.However, the effect of informal contract is more lasting and steady. Therefore, the cluster government should encourage the formal constraint and implicit contracts at the same time for enterprises innovation cooperation. In addition, the government should also guide the construction of the relevant industry association, pay attention to the maintenance and development the cluster informal contract. Through studying the behavior of cluster enterprise innovation cooperation process, this paper can help to learn more about the supervision and constraint mechanism of industrial cluster, promote the transformation and upgrading of industrial cluster, guide the innovation cooperation of cluster enterprise,cultivate industrial cluster with strong innovation and enhance the core competitiveness of the industry development in China.

Key words: industrial cluster, implicit contracts, innovation cooperation, evolutionary game

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