关键词: 公平关切, E-闭环供应链, 主导模式

Abstract: With the rapid development of the Internet, more and more manufacturers prefer to choose the E-closed loop supply chain system which has more opportunities and a larger market. However, with the growth of consumers' purchasing power and awareness of rights in online-shopping, a large number of customers require a network platform to be fairer, making fairness concern to be a key of E-closed loop supply chain's development.
Based on the E-closed loop supply chain which consists of a manufacturer and, third-party network platform, four kinds of decision-making models including are constructed:E-CLSC dominated by manufacturer without fairness concern, E-CLSC dominated by network platform without fairness concern, E-CLSC dominated by manufacturer with fairness concern, E-CLSC dominated by network platform with fairness concern.
In these four models,The profit function of manufacturer is:
π_M=(p-c_n)(Q-Q_o)+(p-c_o-p_o)Q_o-ρpQ-λQ_o
The profit function of network platform is:
π_N=ρpQ+λQ_o-ks²/2
In these functions, c_n is the cost of manufacturer producing new productions; c_o is the cost of manufacturer using wasted products to make recycled goods; p is sales price; p_o is recycling price; s is network platform's service level provided to selling and recycling (assuming the cost of service is ρ(0<ρ<1)); p > c_n > c_o+p_o > p_o > 0 is market demand; Q_o is market recovery amount; ρ(0<ρ<1)represents commission rate of unit sales charged by network platform; Q(p)=α-βp+γs is commission of unit recycling of wasted goods.
According to the profit functions of manufacturer and network platform, by using Stackelberg Game, the sale price, service level, recycling price and profit of each model are calculated and analyzed.
The findings can be drawn that:(1) Whether or not network platform concerned fairness, the sales price, the service level and the manufacturer's profit are all higher with dominant manufacturer than the dominant network platform. (2)The recycling price in CLSC is only influenced by the production cost, the recycling cost and the recycling commission charged by network platform.(3)The fairness concern could decrease the sales price, service level and manufacturer's profit.(4)When the fairness concern's degree is lower, the profit of network platform is higher with the dominant network platform than dominant manufacturer. But when the fairness concern's degree is higher, the profit of network platform is lower with the dominant network platform than dominant manufacturer. (5)When the manufacturer is dominated, the profit of network platform increases firstly and then decreases with the growth of fairness concern's degree. (6) In reality, the network platform would not consider fairness forwardly when it is dominated. However, when the manufacturer is dominated, the network platform would consider fairness.Moreover, because of the pressure of consumer's trust, government's requirement and the competition between enterprises, the network platform has to consider fairness.
The conclusion of this article further enriched the theoretical foundation of E-closed loop supply chain.

Key words: fairness concern, E-CLSC, dominant model