航运供应链上的品牌价值、公平关切与契约协调

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.01.008

中国管理科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (1): 101-112.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.01.008

航运供应链上的品牌价值、公平关切与契约协调

姜宝¹, 李秋实¹, 李剑^1,2

1. 中国海洋大学经济学院;
2. 中国海洋大学海洋发展研究院, 山东青岛 266100

收稿日期:2017-12-27 修回日期:2018-06-11 出版日期:2020-01-20 发布日期:2020-01-19
通讯作者: 李剑(1979-),男(汉族),山东青岛人,中国海洋大学经济学院/海洋发展研究院,教授,研究方向:港口与航运经济,E-mail:lijian@ouc.edu.cn. E-mail:lijian@ouc.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71471105）

Brand Value, Fairness Concern and Contract Coordination on the Shipping Supply Chain

JIANG Bao¹, LI Qiu-shi¹, LI Jian^1,2

1. School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China;
2. Institution of Ocean Development, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China

Received:2017-12-27 Revised:2018-06-11 Online:2020-01-20 Published:2020-01-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 航运供应链上的船公司提高企业品牌价值需要付出大量的投资成本，因此将会更加关注供应链上利润分配的公平。本文以单个船公司和单个货代公司构成的两级航运供应链为研究对象，运用博弈论分析船公司的公平关切行为和品牌投入意愿对航运供应链上各方利润的影响，探讨决策者非理性条件下航运供应链的合作模式和协调机制。研究表明：1）船公司的公平关切提高了其在供应链上利润分配占比，但降低了整个航运供应链的利润和效率；2）随着品牌投入意愿的提高，船公司的公平关切对航运供应链上各方决策的负作用就越明显；3）"收益共享成本共担"式契约能够消除公平关切的负作用，达到航运供应链纵向联盟的最优收益和整体效率。

关键词: 航运供应链, 品牌价值, 公平关切, 品牌投入意愿, 收益共享成本共担

Abstract: The shipping volume fluctuation of international trade makes the competition among the shipping line companies become more and more fierce. On the shipping supply chain the shipping line companies usuallyneed to pay huge investment cost to improve the brand value for keeping the market share, which will lead to their ‘fairness concern’ on the return of brand investment. When shipping line companiesmake decision concerning fairness, not based on complete rationality,it will affect the benefit and efficiency of the whole shipping supply chain. In this paper, the theory of behavioral economics is applied to analyze the effect on the decision making of parties on the shipping supply chain with the shipping line companies' ‘fairness concern’.
This paperstudies the two level shipping supply chain composed of single shipping company and single freight forwarder. It sets up game theory models under three decision-making situationsincluding the centralized decision-making, the decentralized under complete rationality, and the decentralized under the fair concern, and calculate and compare the equilibrium strategy of all parties in the shipping supply chain in the three different situations. The influence of the fairness concern behavior of the shipping company on the operation decision of all parties on the shipping supply chain is discussed. Finally, the cooperation mode and coordination mechanism of the shipping supply chain with the shipping line companies concerning fairness are analyzed.
The results show that:1) the fair concern of shipping line company improves its profit share ratio on the shipping supply chain, but reduces the profit and efficiency of the whole shipping supply chain; 2) with the increase of investment intention, the negative impact of the fairness concerns of shipping company is more obvious on the decisions and profits of the shipping supply chain; 3) Revenue sharing cost sharing contract can eliminate the negative effect offair concern and optimize the income and efficiency of all parties on the shipping supply chain.

Key words: shipping supply chain, brand value, fairness concerns, brand investment intention, revenue sharing cost sharing

中图分类号:

F272

姜宝, 李秋实, 李剑. 航运供应链上的品牌价值、公平关切与契约协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(1): 101-112.

JIANG Bao, LI Qiu-shi, LI Jian. Brand Value, Fairness Concern and Contract Coordination on the Shipping Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(1): 101-112.

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航运供应链上的品牌价值、公平关切与契约协调

Brand Value, Fairness Concern and Contract Coordination on the Shipping Supply Chain

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