基于环境信息和金融市场不对称博弈模型分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.007

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (12): 53-62.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.007

基于环境信息和金融市场不对称博弈模型分析

曲国华¹, 张汉鹏², 刘增良¹, 徐岭³, 张振华⁴, 张强¹

1. 北京理工大学管理与经济学院, 北京 100081;
2. 西南财经大学工商管理学院, 四川成都 610074;
3. 北京石油化工学院经济管理学院, 北京 102600;
4. 广东外语外贸大学经济贸易学院, 广东广州 510006

收稿日期:2014-04-22 修回日期:2014-12-02 出版日期:2015-12-20 发布日期:2015-12-31
作者简介:曲国华(1982-),男(汉族),山西静乐人,北京理工大学管理与经济学院博士研究生,研究方向:信息管理与决策科学.
基金资助:
广东省软科学项目(2015A070704051);广东省自然科学基金项目(2014A030313575);广东省哲学社科十二五规划项目(GD12XGL14);广东省教育厅科技创新项目(2013KJCX0072);广州市哲学社科十二五规划项目(14G41)

Game Model Analysis of Asymmetry Based on Environmental Information and Financial Markets

QU Guo-hua¹, ZHANG Han-peng², LIU Zeng-liang¹, XU Ling³, ZHANG Zhen-hua⁴, ZHANG Qiang¹

1. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China;
2. School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics University, Chengdu 610074 China;
3. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Instituteof Petrochemical of Technology, Beijing 102600, China;
4. School of Economics and Trade, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou 510006, China

Received:2014-04-22 Revised:2014-12-02 Online:2015-12-20 Published:2015-12-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 由于金融市场存在信息不对称使得投资决策者缺乏必要的环境信息,从而导致了投资决策信息不完全、金融资金分配不合理等问题。本文在Nikolaou,Chymis和Evangelinos^[5]提出的环境信息、金融市场不对称博弈模型的基础上,引入政府局中人行为策略,构建了政府、企业与金融市场之间的博弈模型。通过设置相关参数发现,该博弈模型能够覆盖Nikolaou,Chymis和Evangelinos^[5]提出的模型,并证明了在政府局中人参与并满足一定条件的情况下,由环境信息缺失引起的信息不对称问题可以通过引入第三方国际环境审计来解决,从而为我国环境污染问题的化解机制提供新的研究角度。

关键词: 信息不对称, 信号传递, 金融机构, 第三方国际环境审计

Abstract: Due to a lack of essential environmental information, asymmetric information can lead to some problems such as incomplete information for investment decisions and misallocation of financial markets funds in financial markets. Another game model which include three players, government, financial markets and firm is developed by incorporating government moves based on the game model of Nikolaou, Chymis and Evangelinos^[5] financial markets, environmental information asymmetry. By setting the relevant parameters, it is revealed that Nikolaou, Chymis and Evangelinos^[5] model could be covered by above mentioned game model and proved, under the conditions for participation in the government's case, that asymmetric information problem due to the lack of accurate environmental information can be solved by introducing third-party international environmental audit, so as to providing a new research angle for China's environmental problem resolution mechanism.

Key words: information asymmetry, signal transduction, financial Institutions, The third party international environmental audit

中图分类号:

F270

曲国华, 张汉鹏, 刘增良, 徐岭, 张振华, 张强. 基于环境信息和金融市场不对称博弈模型分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12): 53-62.

QU Guo-hua, ZHANG Han-peng, LIU Zeng-liang, XU Ling, ZHANG Zhen-hua, ZHANG Qiang. Game Model Analysis of Asymmetry Based on Environmental Information and Financial Markets[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(12): 53-62.

参考文献

[1] O'dwyer B. Stakeholder democracy:Challenges and contributions from social accounting[J]. Business Ethics:A European Review, 2005, 14(1):28-41.

[2] Blowfield M. Corporate social responsibility:Reinventing the meaning of development?[J]. International Affairs, 2005, 81(3):515-524.

[3] Gale R. Environmental management accounting as a reflexive modernization strategy in cleaner production[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2006, 14(14):1228-1236.

[4] Lorraine N H J, Collison D J, Power D M. An analysis of the stock market impact of environmental performance information[J]. Accounting Forum, 2004,28(1):7-26.

[5] Nikolaou I E, Chymis A, Evangelinos K. Environmental information, asymmetric information, and financial markets:A game-theoretic approach[J]. Environmental Modeling & Assessment, 2013, 18(6):615-628.

[6] Akerlof G A. The market for "lemons":Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84(3):488-500.

[7] Coase R H. The nature of the firm[J]. Economica, 1937, 4(16):386-405.

[8] Williamson O E. Logic of economic organization[J]. Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 1988, 4(1):65-93.

[9] Spence M. Job market signaling[J]. The quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, 87(3):355-374.

[10] Schaltegger S. Information costs, quality of information and stakeholder involvement-The necessity of international standards of ecological accounting[J]. Eco-Management and Auditing, 1997, 4(3):87-97.

[11] Boyer M, Laffont J-J. Environmental risks and bank liability[J]. European Economic Review, 1997, 41(8):1427-1459.

[12] Boyd J. 'Green money' in the bank:Firm responses to environmental financial responsibility rules[J]. Managerial and Decision Economics, 1997, 18(6):491-506.

[13] 郑君君, 韩笑, 邹祖绪, 等. IPO市场中风险投资家策略的演化博弈分析[J]. 管理科学学报, 2012, 15(2):72-82.

[14] Hoque Z. Linking environmental uncertainty to non-financial performance measures and performance:A research note[J]. The British Accounting Review, 2005, 37(4):471-481.

[15] Healy P M, Palepu K G. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2001, 31(1):405-440.

[16] Verrecchia R E. Discretionary disclosure[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1983, 5:179-194.

[17] 张兆国, 靳小翠, 李庚秦. 低碳经济与制度环境实证研究——来自我国高能耗行业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 中国软科学, 2012, (3):109-119.

[18] 张坤民. 低碳世界中的中国:地位, 挑战与战略[J]. 中国人口、资源与环境, 2008, 18(3):1-7.

[19] 张国兴, 张绪涛, 程素杰, 等. 节能减排补贴政策下的企业与政府信号博弈模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(4):129-136.

[20] 杨仕辉, 魏守道. 碳关税对中美两国影响的博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(S2):634-640.

[21] 郭本海, 方志耕, 刘卿. 基于演化博弈的区域高耗能产业退出机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(4):79-85.

[22] Holder-Webb L, Cohen J R, Nath L, et al. The supply of corporate social responsibility disclosures among US firms[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2009, 84(4):497-527.

[23] Chymis A G. Using Friedman to understand the relationship between market competition and corporate social performance.Columbia,Missouri,U.S,:University of Missouri, 2007.

[24] El Ghoul S, Guedhami O, Kwok C C, et al. Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital?[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011, 35(9):2388-2406.

[25] Miles M P, Covin J G. Environmental marketing:A source of reputational, competitive, and financial advantage[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2000, 23(3):299-311.

基于环境信息和金融市场不对称博弈模型分析

Game Model Analysis of Asymmetry Based on Environmental Information and Financial Markets

PDF (PC)

可视化

被引次数

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

Metrics

本文评价

推荐阅读 10

[1]	林志炳. 基于网络外部性的绿色制造策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(9): 137-145.
[2]	马本江, 尹鹏华, 陈晓红, 徐赛雪. 逆向选择条件下带奖惩金的两期保险契约模型及其Pareto改进性研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(8): 30-41.
[3]	赵志明, 王姚, 舒建平. 信息不对称下逆周期缓冲资本对银行投融资的影响[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(6): 13-23.
[4]	金亮, 吴应甲, 赵新杰. 消费者退货对在线零售商促销与合同设计的影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(6): 123-136.
[5]	李红权, 何敏园, 黄莹莹. 我国金融机构的系统重要性评估:基于多元极值理论[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(5): 14-24.
[6]	张盼, 余莉婷, 熊中楷. 政府奖惩下闭环供应链中信息不对称时的最优合同设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(5): 89-100.
[7]	李守伟, 文世航, 王磊, 何建敏, 龚晨. 多层网络视角下金融机构关联性的演化特征研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(12): 35-43.
[8]	冯玲, 文璐, 肖阳. 基于政府隐性担保退出预期的金融机构违约风险重定价[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(11): 43-50.
[9]	曲国华, 刘雪, 李月娇, 曲卫华, 李世宇, 张强. 政府监管与企业加入第三方国际环境审计的模糊博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(1): 113-121.
[10]	金雁南, 田林. 信息不对称下供应链成员的决策顺序研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(11): 158-165.
[11]	尹海员, 朱旭. 投资者异质信念、预期演化与股票市场流动性[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(10): 12-21.
[12]	杨晶玉, 李冬冬. 基于双边减排成本信息不对称的排污权二级交易市场拍卖机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(8): 146-153.
[13]	刘浪, 吴双胜, 史文强. 信息不对称下价格随机的应急数量折扣契约研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(3): 169-176.
[14]	杨立, 赵翠翠, 陈晓红. 基于社交网络的P2P借贷信用风险缓释机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(1): 47-56.
[15]	肖群, 马士华. 信息不对称对闭环供应链MTO和MTS模式的影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(5): 139-148.