采购价格柔性策略与供应链利润风险分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.11.010

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (11): 80-87.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.11.010

采购价格柔性策略与供应链利润风险分析

慕银平, 刘利明

电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 四川成都 610054

收稿日期:2013-09-26 修回日期:2014-08-29 出版日期:2015-11-20 发布日期:2015-12-01
作者简介:慕银平(1976-),男(汉族),甘肃镇原人,电子科技大学经济与管理学院博士,教授.研究方向:运营管理、供应链管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172096);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71432003)

Flexible Procurement Price Policy and Profit-Risk Analysis in Supply Chain

MU Yin-ping, LIU Li-ming

School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China

Received:2013-09-26 Revised:2014-08-29 Online:2015-11-20 Published:2015-12-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 面对原材料市场价格的大幅波动,供应链节点企业需要采用相应策略来规避价格波动带来的风险。本文通过设计价格柔性合同,分析供应链企业通过采购价格柔性策略来缓解采购价格波动给企业利润带来的风险。采用Stackelberg主从博弈模型研究得出了制造商的最优采购数量和供应商的最优价格柔性系数,并分别分析了各最优结果随采购价格柔性合同参数的变化趋势。利用供应链各主体的利润方差度量各自承担的利润风险,分析了供应商和制造商的利润风险随采购价格柔性合同参数的变化规律。

关键词: 供应链管理, 采购价格柔性合同, Stackelberg博弈, 风险分担

Abstract: Due to the price fluctuation of the raw materials, supply chain firms need to relieve the risks of the profit decrease through the procurement price flexibility mechanism. In this paper, a supply chain consist of a supplier and a manufacturer is considered, where the manufacturer buys the raw material from the supplier at the beginning of the lead time and the supplier delivers the raw material to the manufacturer at some time later. By designing a procurement price flexibility contract, the risk relief of the contract on the supplier and the manufacture's profit is analyzed. Using the Stackelberg game, mathematic models are developed to analyze the optimal procurement quantity of the manufacturer and the optimal contract parameters of the supplier. Also the optimal results change trend with the change of the price flexibility contract parameters is discussed. Using variance of the profit the risk undertaken by the supplier and the manufacturer respectively is and measured the change of the risk with the change of the price flexibility parameters is analyzed. The results show that supply contract with proper parameters can improve the profit and relief the profit risk of the supplier and the manufacturer respectively.

Key words: supply chain management, procurement price flexibility contract, stackelberg game, risk-sharing

中图分类号:

F274

慕银平, 刘利明. 采购价格柔性策略与供应链利润风险分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(11): 80-87.

MU Yin-ping, LIU Li-ming. Flexible Procurement Price Policy and Profit-Risk Analysis in Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(11): 80-87.

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采购价格柔性策略与供应链利润风险分析

Flexible Procurement Price Policy and Profit-Risk Analysis in Supply Chain

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