政府补贴下制造商回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.01.008

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 56-64.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.01.008

政府补贴下制造商回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡

孙浩¹, 张桂涛¹, 钟永光¹, 达庆利²

1. 青岛大学管理科学与工程学院山东青岛 266071;
2. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京 211189

收稿日期:2013-06-30 修回日期:2014-11-15 出版日期:2015-01-20 发布日期:2015-01-21
作者简介:孙浩(1981-),男(汉族),山东青岛人,青岛大学管理科学与工程学院,副教授,研究方向:闭环供应链管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202142,71273149,71371102);教育部人文社科青年基金(11YJC630185)

The Equilibrium of Multi-period Closed-loop Supply Chain Network with Manufacturer-collection Channel under Government Subsidies

SUN Hao¹, ZHANG Gui-tao¹, ZHONG Yong-guang¹, DA Qing-li²

1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China;
2. School of Economics &Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China

Received:2013-06-30 Revised:2014-11-15 Online:2015-01-20 Published:2015-01-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为刻画闭环供应链系统运作的动态性和复杂性特点,本文在综合考虑环保约束和政府补贴等因素的基础上,建立了制造商回收模式下的多期闭环供应链网络均衡模型,其中假设市场需求在不同规划期内动态变化,渠道成员通过库存和旧产品的回收连接相邻规划期。运用变分不等式理论分别刻画了制造商层、零售商层和需求市场层的最优行为和均衡条件,进而推导整个多期闭环供应链网络均衡模型。通过投影收缩算法对数值算例进行求解和灵敏度分析,研究结果表明:再制造转化率的提高有利于各渠道成员和消费者利益的改善;尽管资源再生厂向制造商收取未再利用旧产品的处理费能够迫使其提高回收力度,但却导致零售商和闭环供应链收益的损失;政府应实施补贴机制并促进渠道成员之间的协作来改善闭环供应链网络的绩效。这些结论将为现实中闭环供应链节点企业的动态决策以及政府部门制定补贴政策提供支持。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 网络均衡, 变分不等式, 多期, 政府补贴

Abstract: To characterize the dynamics and complexity in the operations of closed loop supply chain (CLSC), a multi-period CLSC network equilibrium model is built under manufacturer-collection channel considering the factors of environmental constraints and government subsidies comprehensively, in which the demand market is assumed to vary dynamically among multi-period planning horizons. Moreover, the adjacent planning period is connected via channel member's holding inventories and EOL products collection. On this basis, variational inequality theory is utilized to characterize the optimal behaviors and equilibrium conditions of non-cooperative manufacturers, retailers and consumer markets respectively, and then the governing multi-period CLSC network equilibrium model is derived. The projection and contraction algorithm is proposed to solve numerical examples and make sensitivity analysis. The results show that the increase of remanufacturing conversion rate is conductive to the improvement of all the channel members' profits and consumer welfares. Despite collection rate can be raised through charging the manufacturers disposal fee for non-recovery EOL products by resource recycling factories, the benefits of the retailers and CLSC systems decrease. The government should implement subsidy mechanisms and promote channel members' cooperation to improve the performances of the CLSC network. These conclusions can provide supports for the channel members in CLSC to make decisions dynamically and for the government to make subsidy policies in reality.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, network equilibrium, variational inequalities, multi-period, government subsidies

中图分类号:

F274

孙浩, 张桂涛, 钟永光, 达庆利. 政府补贴下制造商回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(1): 56-64.

SUN Hao, ZHANG Gui-tao, ZHONG Yong-guang, DA Qing-li. The Equilibrium of Multi-period Closed-loop Supply Chain Network with Manufacturer-collection Channel under Government Subsidies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(1): 56-64.

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政府补贴下制造商回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡

The Equilibrium of Multi-period Closed-loop Supply Chain Network with Manufacturer-collection Channel under Government Subsidies

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