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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (12): 285-293.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0028

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Balanced Purchasing Strategy Based on Information Endowment Difference under Dual Supply and Demand Relationship

Xinjun Li(), Li Wang   

  1. School of Economic and Management,Yantai University,Yantai 264005,China
  • Received:2023-01-06 Revised:2023-05-17 Online:2025-12-25 Published:2025-12-25
  • Contact: Xinjun Li E-mail:lixinjun101@163.com

Abstract:

From the perspective of information ownership and the way of competition in the market. The two-tier supply chain consisting of the integrator of production and marketing, retailers and external supply markets. Retailers have private information of market demand and use order quantities to transmit information. Based on the Lexicographical Maximum Sequential Equilibrium, the integrator of production and marketing analyzes the unique equilibrium and formulates the optimal equilibrium wholesale price to get the unique equilibrium solution. The results show that when the information is shared among supply chains, the integrator of production and marketing and retailers with cooperative competition use signal transmission to make strategic game decisions, under the LMSE criterion, the only separation equilibrium exists when the wholesale price is lower than the threshold value, and the only pooling equilibrium exists when the wholesale price is higher than the threshold value, the uncertainty of demand and the intensity of external competition are the main factors affecting the formulation of equilibrium wholesale price. When the external competition is intense, retailers gain more when the demand uncertainty is high, while the income of the integrator of production and marketing is the opposite; When external competition is not intense, retailers use private information to obtain lower wholesale prices and thus higher profits, while the profits of the integrator of production and marketing increases under the condition of high demand uncertainty. In addition, the value of market demand information increases with the increase of demand uncertainty. Under the separation equilibrium, when the market fluctuation is higher than the threshold value, the profit of the integrator of production and marketing increases with the wholesale price.The wholesale price is set close to the wholesale price under the pooling equilibrium if the integrator of production and marketing chooses the separate equilibrium; If the integrated of production and marketing chooses a pooling equilibrium, the wholesale price is set close to the price offered in the external supply markets. When the demand uncertainty is less than a certain range, separate equilibrium is used when the external competition intensity is relatively high, and pooling equilibrium is used when the external competition intensity is low. When the demand uncertainty is greater than a certain range, only pooling equilibrium can be adopted.This study can be further expanded by, for example, considering cost, other external factors, and risk preference, and exploring the effect of Bertrand-price competition on the profits of both parties; In addition, how other contracts affect the model can be studied.

Key words: information asymmetry, separation equilibrium, pooling equilibrium, signal game, purchasing Strategy

CLC Number: