混合销售模式下农产品电商的区块链技术提供策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0117

Abstract

Abstract:

With the rapid development of e-commerce of agricultural products， the hybrid sales model， which consists of wholesale and agency channels， has gradually become the main sales mode for major e-commerce platforms and their sellers to cooperate. Additionally， due to the typical characteristics of blockchain technology， i.e.， distributed storage， non-tampering and transparency， these platforms can share the information of market demand with their sellers to increase sales and profits. However， the platform will face the elimination of its own information advantages by providing blockchain technology to agriculture-related enterprises. Does the platform have the motivation to share information with upstream agriculture-related enterprises？ Can the platform and agriculture-related enterprises win together？ Under the hybrid sales model， a game-theoretic model is built to consider an e-commerce agriculture supply chain consisting of an e-commerce platform and two agriculture-related enterprises by using Stackelberg game method. One enterprise sells its product to the platform who then sells to customers （wholesale channel）， while the other enterprise sells its product through the platform by paying a commission rate （agency channel）. Whether the platform should provide blockchain strategy （and thus disclose demand information） to neither enterprise， one enterprise， or both enterprises is examined. And its impact of the platform's blockchain provision strategy on agriculture-related enterprises and the conditions for the platform and agriculture-related enterprises to achieve a win-win situation is studied. It is found that： The market uncertainty and the commission rate will play a key role in the platform’s blockchain provision strategy. Specifically， when the demand uncertainty is large and the commission rate is small， the platform should not provide blockchain technology to both agriculture-related enterprises. Nevertheless， when the commission rate is large （both the demand uncertainty and the commission rate are small）， it is better for the platform to provide blockchain strategy for only the agriculture-related enterprise that uses the wholesale （agency） channel. When the demand uncertainty is small and the commission rate is moderate， the platform provides blockchain technology to two agriculture-related enterprises simultaneously. The profit of the corresponding agriculture-related enterprise who is offered blockchain technology increases as the platform’s provision strategy is to provide blockchain for only one enterprise. However， both the agriculture-related enterprises become worse-off as the platform’s provision strategy is to provide or does not blockchain for both enterprises. Additionally， further expanding the study to investigate the existence of network externality and the single wholesale/agent model， it is found that the impact of network externality on the blockchain provision strategy of platform firms is not significant， while the blockchain provision strategy of platform firms under the single wholesale/agent model is significantly different from the hybrid sales model.

Key words: platform economy, e-commerce supply chain of agricultural products, hybrid sales model, blockchain technology, information sharing

CLC Number:

F272

Xiaogang Lin,Hailing Huang,Wenzhuo Li, et al. Blockchain Provision Strategy in Agricultural Products E-commerce under Hybrid Sales Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(10): 259-268.

Figures/Tables 7

符号	含义
$ϵ i$	市场需求不确定性
$σ 2 ∈ (0,1)$	市场需求不确定性的方差
$α s, s = a, b$	$s = a$ ，平台不向涉农企业提供区块链技术的市场规模； $s = b$ ，平台向涉农企业提供区块链技术的市场规模
$w j k$	在 $j k$ 模式下涉农企业R确定的批发价格
$λ ∈ (0,1)$	涉农企业A向平台支付的佣金比例
$q i j k$	在 $j k$ 模式下农产品的生产产量或销售数量
$p i j k$	在 $j k$ 模式下农产品的市场出清价格
$π n j k$ , $n = R, A, P$	分别表示在 $j k$ 模式下涉农企业R、涉农企业A、平台P的利润函数

模式	$E [π R j k *]$	$E [π A j k *]$	$E [π P j k *]$
NN	$(1 - λ) 2 8 (3 - λ)$	$5 - λ 2 (1 - λ) 16 (3 - λ) 2$	$4 + (3 λ + 4 σ 2) (3 - λ) 2 16 (3 - λ) 2$
BN	$[(1 + λ) - 2] 2 8 (3 - λ)$	$1 - λ [α b 7 - λ - 2] 2 + 16 σ 2 16 (3 - λ) 2$	$α b 2 G + 16 (1 + σ 2) - 4 [λ + α b 4 - λ 1 + λ] 16 (3 - λ) 2$
NB	$16 α b α b - 1 - λ + 4 (1 + λ) 2 + (λ - 3) 2 σ 2 32 (3 - λ)$	$(1 - λ) (2 α b - 7 + λ) 2 16 (3 - λ) 2$	$8 α b (4 - λ) (α b - 1 - λ) + 2 G + H σ 2 32 (3 - λ) 2$
BB	$(1 - λ) 2 (α b 2 + σ 2) 8 (3 - λ)$	$5 - λ 2 (1 - λ) (α b 2 + σ 2) 16 (3 - λ) 2$	$[4 + 3 λ 3 - λ 2] (α b 2 + σ 2) 16 (3 - λ) 2$

变量	$α b$				$λ$	$σ 2$
变量	NN	BN	NB	BB	jk	NN	BN	NB	BB
$E [π R j k *]$	—	↑	$S i g n [λ - λ 1]$	↑	↓	—	↑	—	↑
$E [π A j k *]$	—	↓	↑	↑	↓	—	—	↑	↑
$E [π P j k *]$	—	↑	$S i g n [λ 2 - λ]$	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑

参数	$σ 12$	$σ 22$	$σ 32$	$σ 42$	$σ 52$
$α b$	$S i g n [λ 7 - λ]$	↑	$S i g n [λ 2 - λ]$	$S i g n [λ - λ 1]$	↑

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Blockchain Provision Strategy in Agricultural Products E-commerce under Hybrid Sales Model

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