Abstract:

With the increasing demand from consumers for product authenticity recognition， the demand for product information sharing among enterprises is also constantly increasing. The information tracking and sharing functions of blockchain technology have attracted the attention of a large number of enterprises and scholars. However， supply chain members who have access to information on the blockchain may intentionally or unintentionally disclose one party's key information to the other for their own interests， leading to information leakage issues. Information leakage will inevitably change profits， exacerbate the sense of unfairness among the leaked parties， and ultimately lead to the breakdown of cooperation. At the same time， the phenomenon of "free riding" among supply chain members （one party pays the cost to introduce blockchain technology， while the other party enjoys the technology dividend without paying the cost） also creates a strong sense of unfairness among the leaders of blockchain technology introduction， which undermines the security and stability of the operation of supply chain. How to reduce the possibility of information leakage and prevent free riding is the key to improving the sense of fairness of the leading party in cooperation， and also the key to maintaining the security and stability of the supply chain. Based on the rational economic man hypothesis and the reference dependency hypothesis， if the blockchain technology introduction strategy and contract parameters can be adjusted to transfer more profits to partners， the breeding of supply chain unfairness will be avoided. The introduction of blockchain technology by manufacturers in a supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a retailer is considered. From the perspective of the manufacturer introducing blockchain technology， it compares and analyzes the equilibrium benefits of the manufacturer in unilateral and cooperative introduction strategies. In addition， when collaborating with retailers to introduce blockchain technology， incentive issues and information leakage threats are considered， and the cost sharing ratio is adjusted to effectively motivate retailers to achieve cooperation， The price discount adjustment based on cost sharing price discount contract effectively prevents retailers from threatening information leakage.It focuses on the identification of product authenticity by blockchain technology， focusing on product traceability， and considering that the application of blockchain technology is top-down， that is， only when the manufacturer apply blockchain technology can retailers obtain the necessary conditions for applying blockchain. According to the scope of blockchain technology promotion， it is proposed to build three game models： no blockchain technology introduction， manufacturer introduction （such as Mercedes Benz manufacturers）， and manufacturer retailer cooperation introduction （such as Wal Mart）. The main conclusions and management implications are as follows.（1） Based on a sense of fairness， the manufacturer chooses a cooperative introduction strategy rather than a unilateral introduction strategy. In the unilateral introduction strategy， although the profits of supply chain members increase， the perceived benefit of the manufacturer who leads the technology is the lowest， and the perceived benefit decrease with the increase of his own introduction effort， resulting in a strong sense of unfairness from the manufacturer. Collaborating with the retailer under a certain cost sharing ratio can not only increase the total revenue of the supply chain and achieve Pareto optimality， but also consider the fairness psychology to maximize the perceived revenue of the manufacturer. Therefore， the cooperation strategy is superior to the unilateral introduction strategy.（2） Manufacturer can incentivize the retailer to collaborate by adjusting the cost sharing ratio， while maximizing their own interests. When the price discount is within a certain range， the retailer will not leak information， and the price discount value will decrease with the increase of the cost sharing ratio. Retailer profits are more sensitive to the cost sharing ratio， while the profit of the manufacturers is more sensitive to the price discount. The manufacturer offering a certain range of price discounts can effectively prevent retailer information leakage（3） The service provider who do not participate in the introduction of cooperation can also obtain free ride benefits， which increase with the decrease of cost sharing ratio and price discount. In reality， the supply chain structure is more complex， with multiple upstream and downstream enterprises. Not all enterprises are willing to participate in the introduction of blockchain technology， and these enterprises also hope to see a stable cooperation situation.

Key words: blockchain, information leakage, information sharing