Abstract: Under the government’s subsidy for retired power battery recycling, research will be conducted on government’s subsidy, competitive strategies for power battery sales and recycling, and information sharing cooperation plans. In the competitive environment of sales and recycling, the possible alliance situation and profit creation process are analyzed, and the Myerson value is used to solve the noncooperative-cooperative biform game model with a restricted communication structure. At the same time, the problems of information sharing, pricing, recycling strategy optimization, and profit distribution in the supply chain of power batteries are solved. The research results indicate that using the subsidy as an endogenous variable can obtain the optimal solution, providing a theoretical basis for the government to implement the subsidy accurately; The retail price of power batteries is higher in the noncooperative-cooperative biform game model than in the cooperative mode; The proportion of power battery information sharing is higher in the noncooperative-cooperative biform game model than in the competitive mode; The increase in retail price sensitivity coefficient has a negative impact on the retail price and demand of power batteries, the profits of the power battery manufacturer and retailer, and government utility, but has no effect on the subsidy, retired power battery recycling prices and quantities, and the profit of the cascade user; The changing trend of profit for the power battery manufacturer and retailer with recycling competition intensity, and the changing trend of retired power battery recycling prices and quantities for the power battery manufacturer with increasing information sharing cost coefficients for power batteries, are influenced by the values of recycling retired power battery costs and environmental friendliness coefficients; As the proportion of information sharing increases, the recycling price of retired power batteries for the cascade user is influenced by the environmental friendliness coefficient and the cost coefficient of information sharing for retired power batteries, while the recycling amount of retired power batteries of the power battery manufacturer is influenced by the values of the cost of recycling retired power batteries and the environmental friendliness coefficient; As the cost advantage increases, the price and quantity of retired power battery recycling, the profits of the cascade user, and government utility will increase, while the profit of the power battery retailer will decrease.

Key words: Subsidy, Supply chain of power batteries, Noncooperative-cooperative biform game, Information sharing, Myerson value