Abstract:

China’s new-energy-vehicle purchase subsidy policy and double credit policy for vehicles have both played a positive role in the low-carbon development of the automotive industry. However， problems such as the increased financial burden of the subsidy policy have made the complete withdrawal of the policy come to the forefront. At the same time， there is a common concern in politics and academia that the withdrawal of the policy will not be conducive to the low-carbon development of the automobile industry. To this end， the dynamics of the demand for fuel and new energy vehicles and the reduction of fuel consumption and goodwill of automobiles is analyzed. It establishes a differential game model for the supply chain that mixes the production of fuel and new energy vehicles. Based on this， it analyzes the impact of three different policies： subsidies for the purchase of new energy vehicles only， double credit for automobiles only， and subsidies plus double credit on the fuel consumption reduction of cars and the production of the two types of automobiles. It is concluded that as long as a higher proportion of new energy vehicles is required in the double credit policy， the implementation of the double credit policy can promote fuel consumption reduction investment； the withdrawal of the new energy vehicle purchase subsidy will not reduce the demand for fuel vehicles， nor will it have an impact on fuel vehicle consumption reduction. Still， it will affect the market demand for new energy vehicles. However， as long as the mechanism of the dual credit policy is appropriately adjusted， such as the proportion requirement of new energy vehicles and the point value of each new energy vehicle， the demand for new energy vehicles can be promoted to make up for the impact of the complete withdrawal of subsidy policies， and the adjustment of these policies can also promote the fuel consumption reduction of fuel vehicles； After the implementation of the double credit plus subsidy policy， the withdrawal of the subsidy policy so that the manufacturer， the retailer， and the entire profits of the supply chain may go down as well as up， but the change in their earnings is not significant， as the analysis of several numerical examples shows that the difference in the profit levels of all parties in the supply chain and the overall profit level under the two policies is only in the range of 0.28% to 1.92%. The research results provide a theoretical basis for the complete withdrawal of the new-energy-vehicle purchase subsidy policy.

Key words: energy saving and consumption reduction, double credit policy, subsidy policy, differential game, automotive industry