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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (9): 282-292.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1683

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Whether to Open up Live E-commerce Channels? Analysis of the Dynamic Influence of Market Expansion, Cannibalization and Free-rider Effects

Chi Zhou1,2, Yong Qian1, Linlin Zhang3()   

  1. 1.School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China
    2.Business School,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China
    3.School of E-commerce and Logistics,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China
  • Received:2024-09-26 Revised:2025-01-30 Online:2026-09-25 Published:2026-09-01
  • Contact: Linlin Zhang E-mail:zhanglinlin@btbu.edu.cn

Abstract:

As a retail model driven by live streaming content and brands, live e-commerce channels possess both pricing and experiential advantages, creating a competitive relationship with traditional e-commerce channels. A traditional and live-streaming dual-channel sales system is examined, comprising a brand and a streamer. The brand operates two e-commerce sales channels: the traditional channel and the live-streaming channel.

In the traditional channel, the brand enhances its brand reputation through online advertising investments. Simultaneously, the brand engages a streamer to sell products through the live-streaming channel. The popularity of live-streaming is influenced by both the brand's reputation and the streamer's effort level. Therefore, the brand considers whether to establish a live-streaming channel, modeling a differential game for both the traditional and dual-channel (traditional plus live-streaming) scenarios. Using Pontryagin Maximum Principle, equilibrium solutions for brand reputation, live-streaming popularity, and the brand's profit are derived, enabling a dynamic analysis of pricing strategies, advertising investment strategies, and live-streaming strategies.

It is revealed that brand reputation changes monotonically regardless of whether a live-streaming channel is established. After introducing the live-streaming channel, changes in live-streaming popularity are related to the initial brand reputation level. Market cannibalization exhibits two critical thresholds impacting demand in both traditional and live-streaming channels, boosting product demand in the live-streaming channel while encroaching upon market share in the traditional channel. Furthermore, upon establishing a live-streaming channel, the brand reduces product prices to alleviate competition between the traditional and live-streaming channels.

When brand reputation has a minor impact on product demand, introducing a live-streaming channel increases advertising investment and brand reputation levels. However, as brand reputation's influence grows, establishing a live-streaming channel can damage brand reputation, prompting brands to refrain from doing so. When fees are low, a lesser impact of brand reputation on product demand leads to higher advertising investment and brand reputation levels, encouraging brands to establish live-streaming channels. If slot fees are moderate, an appropriate level of brand reputation's influence on product demand and live-streaming popularity can ensure that establishing a live-streaming channel benefits the brand. Otherwise, profits from the live-streaming channel may not compensate for losses in the traditional channel, leading brands to abandon the idea of establishing a live-streaming channel. A bargaining model between traditional and live-streaming channels is established, revealing a unique negotiated market cannibalization coefficient that achieves Nash bargaining equilibrium for both channels

Key words: live e-commerce, channel strategy, brand goodwill, live-streaming popularity, differential game

CLC Number: