Abstract:

With the evolution of e-commerce platforms， it has become common for consumers to delay purchases， anticipating future discounts. Posterior price matching policies help reduce this waiting behavior， especially before major sales events （e.g.， Double 11 shopping festival）. Under such a policy， consumers can request compensation from a retailer if they find a lower price for the same product within a specified period after purchase. The optimal strategy for a retailer to make scientific pricing and price matching decisions， considering consumer waiting behavior， remains unclear. The following questions are addressed： How should a retailer set prices without and with the posterior price matching policy？ How does this policy influence the retailer's optimal pricing and profitability？ What impact do factors such as consumer characteristics and future market size have on the retailer’s decision to adopt the policy？To address these questions， a market consisting of two consumer types is modeled： waiting and immediate purchase. A two-period framework for a retailer's pricing and price matching decisions is developed， analyzing two scenarios： non-adoption （Scenario N） and adoption （Scenario M） of the posterior price matching policy.The findings indicate that the potential market size in the second period significantly impacts the retailer's optimal pricing decision. The presence of waiting consumers prompts retailers without the price matching policy to lower prices in the second period. Conversely， retailers with the policy may maintain or increase prices due to compensation claims， though price reductions cannot be entirely ruled out. Additionally， the policy can lower overall price levels and increase profits under certain conditions， benefiting both retailers and consumers. The mechanisms and conditions under which a retailer adopts the posterior price matching policy from the perspective of consumer structure are examined. In other words， the main contribution of this study is to examine the retailer's optimal pricing strategies with and without the posterior price matching policy， and to analyze the mechanisms by which the policy affects optimal pricing and profitability as well as the conditions under which the retailer can benefit from the policy. It enriches theoretical research on price matching policies and offers practical guidance for retailers in this study. Specifically， retailers should fully investigate the utility loss and proportion of waiting consumers， the rate of compensation claims， and the potential market size of the second period in order to scientifically decide on the posterior price matching policy. At the same time， retailers should endeavor to create the image that they will not reduce prices when they adopt the posterior price matching policy in order to increase their profits. Market administrators are encouraged to promote the policy under suitable conditions， as it benefits both retailers and consumers. In addition， Individual consumers should utilize the policy judiciously and monitor post-purchase prices.

Key words: pricing strategy, posterior price matching policy, consumers' waiting behavior, consumer structure