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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (4): 243-255.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0619cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0619

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考虑公平关切的混合回收渠道闭环供应链决策研究

曹晓刚1,3, 曹博威1, 闻卉2()   

  1. 1.武汉纺织大学管理学院,湖北 武汉 430073
    2.湖北工业大学理学院,湖北 武汉 430068
    3.湖北省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地—企业决策支持研究中心,湖北 武汉 430073
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-13 修回日期:2023-08-14 出版日期:2026-04-25 发布日期:2026-03-27
  • 通讯作者: 闻卉 E-mail:wen_hui@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    湖北省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地—企业决策支持研究中心重点项目(DSS20220602);湖北省高等学校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(省社科基金前期资助项目)(22ZD086);湖北省教育厅哲学社会科学研究重点项目(23D058)

Closed-loop Supply Chain Decision of Hybrid Recycling Channels Considering Fairness Concerns

Xiaogang Cao1,3, Bowei Cao1, Hui Wen2()   

  1. 1.School of Management,Wuhan Textile University,Wuhan 430073,China
    2.School of Science,Hubei University of Technology,Wuhan 430068,China
    3.The key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences in Colleges and Universities in Hubei Province— Enterprise Decision Support Research Center,Wuhan 430073,China
  • Received:2023-04-13 Revised:2023-08-14 Online:2026-04-25 Published:2026-03-27
  • Contact: Hui Wen E-mail:wen_hui@126.com

摘要:

本文建立了由不同回收主体组成的混合回收渠道闭环供应链模型,在零售商与第三方回收商具有公平关切行为的基础上,对比了4种混合回收渠道模式下供应链成员的均衡决策与利润,即制造商和零售商混合回收渠道(MR)模型,制造商和第三方回收商混合回收渠道(MT)模型,零售商和第三方回收商混合回收渠道(RT)模型,制造商、零售商及第三方回收商混合回收渠道(MRT)模型。研究结果表明:(1)闭环供应链中成员的回收竞争将降低废旧产品回收总量;(2)当零售商与第三方回收商的公平关切程度超出一定范围时,双方的最优回收模式将发生改变;(3)不同模式下公平关切系数对效用的影响存在差异,且零售商与第三方回收商在RT模式下存在最大效用。最后,通过数值分析证明了结论的有效性。

关键词: 混合回收渠道, 公平关切, 闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

With the continuous improvement of social material living standards, the amount of waste is also increasing. Although China 's resource recycling capacity has been significantly enhanced, the overall efficiency of resource utilization is still not high, and the problem of low standardization level of renewable resource recycling has not been completely solved. How to improve the recycling system of waste materials in China and improve the level of resource recycling is still an urgent problem to be solved. Some enterprises improve the recycling of resources by multi-channel recycling. For example, in addition to carrying out recycling business on the official website and self-operated offline service stores, Huawei also cooperates with Jingdong, Aihuishou and other enterprises to carry out electronic equipment recycling and trade-in; in addition to recycling directly from consumers through after-sales channels, Midea also opens old machine recycling services to its distributors. However, when enterprises cooperate with enterprises in different channels, the behavioral preferences of different enterprises, such as fairness concerns, will affect their willingness to cooperate and bargaining power. In view of this, the following research questions are proposed: (1) What is the optimal decision of supply chain members under fairness concerns? (2) How does the fairness concerns behavior of supply chain members affect the optimal decision and profit? (3) Which recycling mode is optimal for the supply chain when the supply chain members have fairness concerns?To solve these problems, the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) structure of hybrid recycling channels composed of different recycling participants is investigated. Considering the fairness concerns behavior of the retailer and the third-party recycler, four kinds of hybrid recycling channel models are established to compare the equilibrium decisions and profit of supply chain members: the hybrid recycling channel model of the manufacturer and retailer (MR); the hybrid recycling channel model of the manufacturer and third-party collector (MT); the hybrid recycling channel model of the retailer and third-party collector (RT); and the hybrid recycling channel model of the manufacturer, retailer and third-party collector (MRT). The result shows that: (1) the recycling competition among members in the CLSC will reduce the total recycling quantity of waste products; (2) when the fairness concerns of the retailer and the third-party collector exceed a certain range, the optimal recycling mode of both members witnesses a change; (3) the influence of fairness concerns coefficient on utility is diverse under different models, and the retailer and third-party collector have the maximum utility in RT mode. Finally, the effectiveness of the conclusion is demonstrated through numerical analysis.

Key words: hybrid recycling channels, fairness concerns, closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game

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