主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (2): 309-322.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0631cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0631

• • 上一篇    下一篇

区块链平台不同收费情形下疫苗供应链博弈模型及协调策略

刘瑞环1, 赵程伟1(), 谭春桥2   

  1. 1.中南林业科技大学经济管理学院,湖南 长沙 410004
    2.南京审计大学商学院,江苏 南京 211815
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-14 修回日期:2023-08-18 出版日期:2026-02-25 发布日期:2026-02-04
  • 通讯作者: 赵程伟 E-mail:zhchengw@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72371132);国家社会科学基金项目(22BJL114);湖南省自然科学基金项目(2025JJ60462);湖南省自然科学基金项目(2024JJ6104);湖南省教育厅重点项目(25A0234)

Game Models and Coordination Strategies of Blockchain-based Vaccine Supply Chain under Different Charging Scenarios

Ruihuan Liu1, Chengwei Zhao1(), Chunqiao Tan2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management,Central South University of Forestry and Technology,Changsha 410004,China
    2.School of Business,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China
  • Received:2023-04-14 Revised:2023-08-18 Online:2026-02-25 Published:2026-02-04
  • Contact: Chengwei Zhao E-mail:zhchengw@163.com

摘要:

根据当前疫苗安全问题亟待解决且区块链平台拥有不同收费方式的现状,构建传统疫苗供应链和不同收费情形下基于区块链的疫苗供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,分析关键因素对最优决策的影响,探讨疫苗供应链与区块链平台合作的条件以及收费方式选择,并研究不同收费情形下基于区块链的疫苗供应链协调策略。结果表明:减少消费者检验疫苗花费的时间及控制问题疫苗数量,能有效提升疫苗供应链利润。当被认定为问题疫苗的比例与区块链平台的边际服务成本均较低时,引入区块链平台对疫苗供应链更有利。当区块链平台边际服务成本较高时,应选择按服务费用收费方式。在按固定费用收费情形下,当区块链平台边际服务成本等于某一值时,疫苗供应链不需要协调;当边际服务成本较低时,“收益共享+固定补贴”组合合同可实现疫苗供应链协调。在按服务费用收费情形下,疫苗供应链能否达到协调,不仅与收益共享比例和区块链平台边际服务成本有关,还与区块链平台向疫苗生产商和接种单位收取的总服务费用有关。

关键词: 疫苗供应链, 区块链平台, 收费方式, Stackelberg博弈, 协调策略

Abstract:

Blockchain technology can effectively solve the vaccine safety problem. When vaccine supply chain members work with a blockchain platform, there are two main charging ways for the blockchain platform, namely the charging by fixed fee and the charging by service fee. However, current research has not considered the impact of different charging methods on vaccine supply chain operational decisions and coordination strategies. Based on this, the Stackelberg game models of the traditional vaccine supply chain and the blockchain-based vaccine supply chain under different charging scenarios are constructed, the influence of key factors on the optimal decision are analyzed, the conditions for cooperation between the vaccine supply chain and the blockchain platform and the selection of charging methods of the blockchain platform are discussed, and the coordination strategies of blockchain-based vaccine supply chain under different charging scenarios are studies.The results show that reducing the time taken by vaccinators to test vaccines and controlling the number of problematic vaccines can effectively improve the profit of vaccine supply chain. When both the proportion of identified as problematic vaccines and the marginal service cost of the blockchain platform are low, the introduction of the blockchain platform is more beneficial to vaccine supply chain. When the marginal service cost of blockchain platform is high, the charging method by service fee should be selected. Under the charging scenario of fixed fee, when the marginal service cost is equal to a certain value, the vaccine supply chain does not need coordination; when the marginal service cost is below the value, the revenue-sharing and fixed subsidy combined contract can realize the coordination of vaccine supply chain. Whether the vaccine supply chain can achieve coordination under the charging scenario of service fee is related not only to the marginal service cost of the blockchain platform and revenue sharing proportion, but also to the total service fee charged by the blockchain platform to the vaccine manufacturer and the vaccination unit.

Key words: vaccine supply chain, blockchain platform, charging method, Stackelberg game, coordination strategie

中图分类号: