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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (6): 36-49.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0979cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0979

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数据交易驱动下在线商家产品个性化定价研究

常建红, 宋鹏(), 吴丽荣   

  1. 山西大学经济与管理学院,山西 太原 030031
  • 收稿日期:2024-06-20 修回日期:2024-09-28 出版日期:2026-06-25 发布日期:2026-05-22
  • 通讯作者: 宋鹏 E-mail:songpeng@sxu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72171137)

Personalized Pricing Strategy for Online Merchant Driven by Data Transactions

Jianhong Chang, Peng Song(), Lirong Wu   

  1. School of Economics and Management,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030031,China
  • Received:2024-06-20 Revised:2024-09-28 Online:2026-06-25 Published:2026-05-22
  • Contact: Peng Song E-mail:songpeng@sxu.edu.cn

摘要:

面对数字经济时代数据成为重要生产要素和企业利用数据对消费者实行价格歧视的现状,研究实现数据要素的有效利用与防止歧视定价造成消费者福利受损两者之间的平衡成为当前平台经济可持续发展的重要课题。为解决上述问题,本文考虑了由平台-商家-消费者三个主体参与的平台经济,分别构建了商家与平台间无数据交易、发生数据交易及数据交易优化情形下的博弈模型。研究发现:数据交易的发生,将商家购买的消费者数据划分为不同价值数据类型,针对不同价值数据类型,平台应采取不同的数据价格策略。本文进一步比较了三种情形下的消费者剩余,发现在数据交易优化情形下,商家的个性化定价会提高低支付意愿消费者的福利,平台-商家-消费者三方实现共赢。但是,对于高支付意愿消费者,数据交易下商家的个性化定价对其福利降低还是提高,还需要考虑平台积累的数据对消费者效用的转化程度,当数据效用转化程度较高时,数据交易下商家的个性化定价会提高高支付意愿消费者的福利。最后,本文发现,数据交易下的个性化定价是否能够提高消费者总剩余、生产者总剩余和社会总福利,皆取决于平台数据精确程度和数据效用转化程度的交互作用。

关键词: 数据交易, 数据定价, 个性化定价, 异质性消费者

Abstract:

With the development of the information economy, data has emerged as a pivotal production factor within the digital economy, and it has led to the emergence of data transactions involving consumer information in the market. Although data brings tremendous benefits to both enterprises and consumers, the practice of enterprises utilizing consumer data to implement discriminatory pricing has raised significant societal concerns. It is imperative to prioritize research focusing on achieving a balance between the effective utilization of data and preventing the adverse effects of discriminatory pricing on consumer welfare for the sustainable development of the current platform economy. To address this issue, a platform economy is constructed with the participation of three players, namely, platform-merchant-consumers. A game-theoretic framework encompassing three scenarios is proposed: no data transactions, data transactions, and optimized data transactions between the merchant and the platform. The findings indicate that data transactions segment the consumer data acquired by the merchant into various types with distinct values. Consequently, the platform should adopt differentiated data pricing strategies tailored to these distinct data types. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of consumer surplus across the three scenarios reveals that personalized pricing by the merchant, particularly under the optimized data transactions scenario, enhances the welfare of consumers with low willingness to pay. This situation creates a mutually beneficial outcome for the platform-merchant-consumers triad. However, the impact of personalized pricing on consumers with high willingness to pay largely hinges on the extent to which the platform can convert accumulated data into consumer utility. In instances of high conversion rates, personalized pricing contributes positively to the welfare of such consumers. Ultimately, it is demonstrated that whether personalized pricing in data transactions can enhance total consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare depends critically on the accuracy of the platform’s data and the conversion of data into utility. A novel approach is introduced to mitigating the issue of consumer welfare detriment resulting from discriminatory pricing. Additionally, it also holds value and significance in efficiently vitalizing data resources, converting them into valuable data assets, and enhancing the efficacy of data resource distribution.

Key words: data transactions, data pricing, personalized pricing, heterogeneous consumers

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