软件平台跟进性技术投资策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0244

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

随着人工智能、区块链、增强现实等新兴技术的发展，越来越多的软件平台投资新技术以实现持续创新。针对软件平台的跟进性技术投资决策，本文考虑软件平台投资技术的功能水平以及跨边网络效应，构建了竞争环境下的平台投资策略博弈模型，研究两个竞争软件平台中平台1已对一项技术进行投资，平台2如何做出跟进性投资策略选择以及最优定价决策。研究发现，当软件开发商整合该技术的单位成本较低、平台开发技术的单位成本较高且平台进行跟进性投资的技术功能水平较低时，该平台应跟进此技术的投资。随着用户对于开发商的网络效应增加，平台进行跟进投资的意愿随之增强。开发商对于用户的网络效应对平台的跟进性技术投资意愿影响受其投资技术的功能水平影响。

关键词: 软件平台, 第三方开发商, 技术投资, 技术功能水平, 整合能力

Abstract:

As emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence， blockchain and augmented reality grow， an increasing number of software platforms are investing in new technologies to foster continuous innovation. In practice， some lead software platforms are forward-looking in the development of emerging technologies. Due to the difficulty and uncertainty of developing emerging technologies， investments by various software platforms in the same technology often occur sequentially in the market. When one software platform has already invested in a new technology， the subsequent investment strategies pursued by other platforms may vary.Therefore， the software platform’s follow-up strategies on technology investment are examined by considering the functional level of the technologies invested by competing platforms and cross-side network effects. A game-theoretical model of platform investment strategy in a duopoly setting is developed， to study how the platform makes a follow-up investment choice and the optimal pricing decision when one of the competing platforms has invested in a new technology. Specifically， the optimal follow-up technology investment strategy of the software platform is first analyzed， followed by an exploration of the impact of cross-side network effects on the platforms’ follow-up investment decisions. Finally， the optimal decision regarding the technological functional level is examined when the platform engages in follow-up technology investment.The main findings are as follows， the platform should follow up the technology investment when the marginal integration cost of developers is low， the marginal development cost of the platform is high， and the functional level of the technology invested by the platform is low. As the user-to-developer network effect increases， the platform's willingness to follow up the technology investment increases. The impact of the developer-to-user network effect on the platform's willingness to follow up the technology investment is affected by the functional level of its investment technology. It provides insights into the investment strategy decisions of software platforms regarding emerging technologies， while also addressing the gap in existing literature concerning the research on follow-up investment strategies of competitive software platforms.

Key words: software platform, third-party developer, technology investment, functional level of the technology, integration capability

中图分类号:

F224

李敏强,苑楠,冯海洋. 软件平台跟进性技术投资策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(4): 231-242.

Minqiang Li,Nan Yuan,Haiyang Feng. Follow-up Strategies on Technology Investment for the Software Platform[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(4): 231-242.

图/表 7

表1

模型符号和基本说明"

符号	基本说明
$v$	用户加入平台获得的基本价值
$μ i$	平台 $i$ 投资技术带来的新价值， $i ∈ 1,2$
$β$	开发商给用户带来的网络效应强度
$α$	从用户对于开发商的网络效应强度
$r$	开发商向平台缴纳的交易费
$λ$	开发商整合技术的边际成本
$c$	平台投资新技术的单位开发成本
$p i O$	平台2不跟进投资时平台 $i$ 向用户收取的进入费
$p i I$	平台2投资时平台 $i$ 向用户收取的进入费
$N d i O$	平台2不跟进投资时加入平台 $i$ 的开发商数量
$N c i O$	平台2不跟进投资时加入平台 $i$ 的用户数量
$π p i O$	平台2不跟进投资时平台 $i$ 的利润, $i ∈ 1,2$
$π p i I$	平台2投资时平台 $i$ 的利润

表1

图1

图2

图3

图4

图5

图6

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