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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (10): 274-286.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1191

• • 上一篇    

基于闭环供应链的回收商再售与制造商再制造能力提升策略研究

李增禄1, 姚远1, 熊熊2()   

  1. 1.河南大学商学院,河南 开封 475004
    2.天津大学管理与经济学部,天津 300072
  • 收稿日期:2024-07-22 修回日期:2024-09-28 出版日期:2026-10-25 发布日期:2026-10-09
  • 通讯作者: 熊熊 E-mail:xxpeter@tju.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家资助博士后研究人员计划项目(GZC20240390);中国博士后科学基金第75批面上项目(2024M750787);河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2025BJJ044);河南省高校人文社会科学研究一般项目(2026-ZZJH-013)

Research on the Strategies to Improve Manufacturer’s Remanufacturing Capabilities Considering Resale by the Recycler Based on a Closed-loop Supply Chain

Zenglu Li1, Yuan Yao1, Xiong Xiong2()   

  1. 1.School of Business,Henan University,Kaifeng 475004,China
    2.College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China
  • Received:2024-07-22 Revised:2024-09-28 Online:2026-10-25 Published:2026-10-09
  • Contact: Xiong Xiong E-mail:xxpeter@tju.edu.cn

摘要:

本文在闭环供应链中研究了回收商再售对制造商再制造能力提升策略的影响,回收商将回收品以二手产品形式进行再售,一方面降低了对制造商再制造原材料的供给;另一方面与制造商进行市场竞争。该行为是否会倒逼制造商提升再制造能力,制定较高的转移价格诱导回收商减少再售缓解市场竞争,同时能否激发回收商的回收热情提升回收率是本文的核心问题。建立回收商无再售的基准模型和考虑回收商再售的决策模型,并通过动态博弈和非线性规划理论进行模型求解。研究发现:对回收商而言,再售有助于激发回收热情,同时能够倒逼制造商制定较高的回收品转移价格,因此回收商在允许再售的约束条件下一定会选择再售策略。对制造商而言,若制造商再制造成本节约量较低,则提升再制造能力;若再制造成本节约量较高,则不提升再制造能力。此外,通过对均衡策略下回收率和消费者剩余的分析发现,回收商通过再售倒逼制造商提升再制造能力在某些情形下有助于回收率和消费者剩余的增大,实现企业、环境和消费者的多方共赢。

关键词: 回收商, 再售, 再制造能力, 闭环供应链

Abstract:

Recycling and remanufacturing have always been seen as a favourable and effective way of dealing with the problem of used products. Recyclers often collect used products from the consumer market and sell them to manufacturers for remanufacturing at a certain transfer price. In recent years, with the growth of the secondhand economy, some recyclers have begun to resell recycled goods in the form of secondhand products. The resale of used products by recyclers reduces the amount of remanufactured material available to manufacturers, at which point the incentive for manufacturers to improve remanufacturing capabilities becomes the central question. Thus, the impact of the resale behavior of the recycler on the manufacturer’s remanufacturing capacity improvement strategy is studied. The recycler resells recycled goods as secondhand products, which on the one hand reduces the supply of remanufactured materials to the manufacture, and on the other hand competes with the manufacturer in the consumer market, whether this behavior will force manufacturers to enhance their remanufacturing capacity and set higher transfer prices to induce recyclers to reduce re-sale to alleviate the competition in the market, and at the same time, whether it can stimulate recyclers’ recycling enthusiasm to improve recycling rate. The benchmark model of no resale is established, and then the game model considering resale of the recycler is constructed. The models are solved by dynamic game and nonlinear programming theory. It is found that: Firstly, for the recycler, resale has been shown to encourage the recycler’s enthusiasm for recycling, hence increasing the recycling amount and forcing the manufacturer to set a higher transfer price. Therefore, the recycler must choose the resale strategy under the constraint that the resale is permitted. Second, for manufacturers, remanufacturing capacity is boosted if the manufacturer's remanufacturing cost savings are low, while remanufacturing capacity is not boosted if the remanufacturing cost savings are high. In addition, the analysis of recycling rate and consumer surplus reveals that recyclers’ re-selling to force manufacturers to enhance their remanufacturing capacity helps to increase the recycling rate and consumer surplus, which can achieve a win-win situation for enterprises, the environment and consumers. It is expected that this research can provide some reference for manufacturers to improve remanufacturing capacity and provide theoretical basis for recyclers to formulate resale strategies.

Key words: recycler, resale, product remanufacturing capability, closed-loop supply chain

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