基于公平偏好的存货质押融资3PL激励机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1417

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文聚焦存货质押模式下银行与第三方物流(3PL)间的委托代理关系，将3PL公平偏好和能力信息不对称作为重要因素纳入委托监管契约机制设计中，探究二者对银行和3PL决策行为及效用的影响。结果表明：(1)相较于完全理性，3PL的公平偏好提高了物流企业承担的损失比例和付出的努力水平，且均随公平偏好程度的提高而不断增加；(2)相较于能力信息对称，3PL能力信息的不对称降低了物流企业承担的损失比例和付出的努力水平；(3)忽视3PL的公平偏好行为会损害银行的利益，特别是在3PL能力信息不对称情况下，银行提供的合同菜单将无法实现有效的信息甄别；(4)当银行考虑3PL公平偏好，则无论其是否存在公平偏好，能力信息对称时3PL只能获得保留效用；而当能力信息不对称时，3PL能够获得信息租金，且随3PL公平偏好程度和能力水平的提高而增加；(5)当3PL能力信息不对称且行业公平收益水平较低时，公平偏好的存在能够同时增加3PL和银行的期望效用，实现“双赢”。研究结果可为存货质押模式下3PL的激励机制设计问题提供理论依据和决策参考。

关键词: 存货质押；公平偏好；道德风险；逆向选择；激励机制

Abstract: Inventory pledge loan is an important financing method in supply chain finance. To solve the problem of operational funds shortage, firms approach the bank for a loan by pledging their products, semi-finished products and raw materials. In this process, third party logistics (3PL) plays an important role. Specifically, 3PLs are responsible for the supervision of pledges, and it’s obvious that the ability and effort level of 3PL will affect the supervision quality, which is very critical for determining whether the business can be carried out smoothly. However, information asymmetry always exists between the bank and 3PL, and those two elements are often private information of 3PL, which cannot be mastered by the bank in advance. On the other hand, many scholars have pointed out that the hypothesis of rational economic man is not entirely tenable, and supply chain members often pay great attention to fairness in reality.

Key words: inventory pledge loan; fairness preference; moral hazard; adverse selection; incentive mechanism

中图分类号:

F830

王璐,林凯,陈丽华. 基于公平偏好的存货质押融资3PL激励机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(9): 82-93.

WANG Lu,LIN Kai,CHEN Li-hua. Research of Incentive Mechanism for 3PL Based on Fairness Preference in Inventory Pledge Loan[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(9): 82-93.

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