关键词: 碳配额交易, 动态绿色感知, 碳减排决策, 政府补贴, 微分博弈

Abstract: The regulation and mitigation of carbon emissions have become critical priorities worldwide. Consequently, many national governments have sequentially introduced diverse emission reduction policies, while the carbon trading market has been demonstrated as an efficacious market-based mechanism, serving as a crucial tool for mitigating carbon emissions. Furthermore, consumers' green consciousness is progressively intensifying, with an increasing number of consumers expressing concerns about the carbon footprint of products. Existing literature has examined factors influencing emission reduction and the impact of consumer green consciousness on such reduction efforts. However, there is limited consideration given to the dynamic change in consumers' green perception. Given that consumers' green perception, akin to carbon reduction amount, constitutes a long-term dynamic process influenced by factors such as technological innovation endeavors. Therefore, considering the cap-and-trade and taking dynamic green perception and dynamic carbon reduction into account simultaneously, this paper investigates the impact of different government subsidy policies (consumer subsidy under the TC model and manufacturer subsidy under the TM model) on optimal decision-making in the supply chain. Furthermore, leveraging carbon emission data from energy-efficient air conditioners by Midea, along with cost data for Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS), and current carbon price from the cap-and-trade, we conducted a numerical analysis to examine the impacts of carbon trading prices and production emission coefficients on enterprise profits, societal welfare, and carbon emissions. We find that: (1) Compared to the TM model, the proactive attention of supply chain members to environmental costs has been effectively enhanced under the TC model. (2) The steady-state value of societal welfare under the TC model surpasses that under the TM model from the long-term perspective. However, during the initial stages of product introduction, the societal welfare is lower under the TC model, even lower than that under the no-subsidy model. (3) When both the carbon trading price and consumer green preferences are relatively high, the optimal subsidy rate under the TC model is higher.

Key words: cap-and-trade, dynamic green perception, emission reduction, government subsidy, differential game