关键词: 技术垄断, 合作创新, 三方演化博弈, 外部融资

Abstract: Since the outbreak of Sino-U.S. trade friction, the U.S. has imposed a technical blockade on China at a certain technological level. Huawei's sanction incident shows that under the background of internationalization of the high-tech product supply chain when the key part of core technology is monopolized by external suppliers, enterprises are inevitably controlled by foreign suppliers. For long-term development, enterprises must break through the external monopoly of the key part of core technology, and cooperation between enterprises and universities and research institutes is effective. In view of the phenomenon that enterprises are at risk of price control when the key part of core technology can be imported from abroad, this paper constructs a mixed strategy evolutionary game matrix of enterprises, R&D entities, and foreign suppliers, in which enterprises need to make decisions on whether to invest in R&D entities and lead the creation of innovation consortia. The main strategy of R&D is to strive for R&D or not. The strategy space of foreign suppliers is to increase the product price or not increase the product price, and the influencing factors of tripartite strategy choice are analyzed. As the breakthrough of the key part of core technology is faced with financial difficulties such as high R&D investment, long investment cycle, and high sunk cost, external financing may be needed. The influence of different external financing modes on the evolutionary stability strategy is further analyzed. The results show that technology outsourcing cost and R&D success income have a threshold effect on enterprises' willingness to invest in cooperative innovation R&D. The influence of expected R&D income on R&D main body strategy presents an inverted U-shaped relationship. Self-owned technology will break the evolution and stability of foreign suppliers' price increase strategy. When the enterprise's own funds are insufficient, the debt financing will slow down the formation of an evolutionarily stable strategy of active cooperation and innovation, while the equity financing can promote the formation of an evolutionarily stable strategy of active cooperation and innovation under the condition of giving profits. Only equity financing can restrain the formation of passive cooperative innovation evolution and stability strategy. The results show that technology outsourcing cost and R&D success income have a threshold effect on enterprises' willingness to invest in cooperative innovation R&D. The influence of expected R&D income on R&D main body strategy presents an inverted U-shaped relationship. Self-owned technology will break the evolution and stability of foreign suppliers' price increase strategy. When the enterprise's own funds are insufficient, the debt financing will slow down the formation of an evolutionarily stable strategy of active cooperation and innovation, while the equity financing can promote the formation of an evolutionarily stable strategy of active cooperation and innovation under the condition of giving profits. Only equity financing can restrain the formation of passive cooperative innovation evolution and stability strategy.

Key words: technology monopoly, cooperative innovation, tripartite evolutionary game, external financing