基于风险规避和公平偏好的供应链收益共享契约协调研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1312

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在一个简单的二级供应链系统中，建立了供应商和零售商同时具有风险规避和公平偏好的收益共享契约协调模型，通过修正、扩展FS效用收益模型，先后考察并分析了分散决策和集中决策下供应链的协调状态，研究发现，供应商和零售商的风险规避系数和公平偏好系数及收益份额必须满足特定的条件，收益共享契约才能使系统供应链整体达到协调状态；在此基础上，对风险规避和公平偏好因素进行敏感度分析，得到供应商和零售商行为偏好系数对供应链及成员最优订货量的影响；最后进行演化博弈算例分析和结论验证，体现了该协调模型的有效性和实用性。由此说明供应商和零售商的风险规避和公平偏好因素同时作用会改变系统供应链协调时的最优订货量，并对决策人的决策行为产生很大的影响。

关键词: 收益共享契约, 风险规避和公平偏好, 供应链协调, 行为供应链管理

Abstract: Based on the existing literature, the expected utility decision model of suppliers and retailers with dual preference behavior is established. Through the derivation, analysis and solution of the model, the influence mechanism of fairness preference and risk aversion on the decision-making of the behavior subject of the supply chain and the coordination of the whole supply chain are discussed in this paper. Then, the model is verified by numerical analysis. In order to promote the coordinated development of supply chain, a strategy of supply chain quality management based on dual behavior preference is proposed.
The research results are as follows:firstly, when both retailers and suppliers have fairness preference and risk aversion, the fairness preference, risk aversion and revenue share of suppliers and retailers must meet certain specific conditions to achieve the coordination of revenue sharing contract. Second, when the retailer's revenue share is larger than that of the supplier, the retailer's optimal order quantity and supply chain system will increase the retailer's fairness preference, reduce or increase the supplier's fairness preference, and reduce or increase the risk aversion of the retailer and supplier. Finally, the influence of the change of market economy parameters on decision making is analyzed. In fact, the decision maker can predict the market trend of the supply chain system based on these conclusions, and adjust relevant parameters in time to maximize the system benefit.

Key words: revenue sharing contract, risk aversion and fair preference, supply chain coordination, conduct supply chain management

中图分类号:

F270

王永明, 余小华, 尹红丽. 基于风险规避和公平偏好的供应链收益共享契约协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(7): 148-159.

WANG Yong-ming, YU Xiao-hua, YIN Hong-li. Revenue Sharing Contract Coordination of Supply Chain Considering Risk and Fairness Dual Preferences[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(7): 148-159.

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