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中国管理科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (12): 87-97.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.12.009

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

电商闭环供应链中的“让利”公平关切回收决策研究

王玉燕1, 苏梅1, 申亮2, 梁佳平1   

  1. 1. 山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 山东 济南 250014;
    2. 山东财经大学财政税务学院, 山东 济南 250014
  • 收稿日期:2019-04-10 修回日期:2019-12-31 出版日期:2020-12-20 发布日期:2021-01-11
  • 通讯作者: 王玉燕(1978-),女(汉族),山东禹城人,山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,教授,博士,博士生导师,研究方向:博弈论应用与供应链管理,E-mail:wangyuyan1224@126.com. E-mail:wangyuyan1224@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971129,715011);山东省高等学校优秀青年创新支持计划(2019RWG017);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(19BJCJ12)

Recovery Decision of Altruistic Fairness Concern on E-Commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain

WANG Yu-yan1, SU Mei1, SHEN Liang2, LIANG Jia-ping1   

  1. 1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China;
    2. School of Public Finance and Taxation, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China
  • Received:2019-04-10 Revised:2019-12-31 Online:2020-12-20 Published:2021-01-11

摘要: 针对单一再造商和单一电商平台构成的两阶段电商闭环供应链,本文研究了电商闭环供应链的三种回收决策模型:再造商无公平关切的分散决策模型、再造商让利公平关切的分散决策模型以及联合决策模型。然后,求解分析模型,给出每种模式的最优回收策略,并对三种模式的最优决策进行比较分析。在此基础之上,进一步设计电商闭环供应链的"回收成本共担联合收益共享"契约,实现系统的协调。最后,采用数值分析对模型结论进行验证。研究发现:(1)再造商的公平关切行为是一种"让利"行为:虽然对自身收益不利,但是对电商平台和消费者都有利,当让利公平关切程度不高于0.5时,对系统利润起到促进作用,但是当让利程度超高0.5时,会造成系统利润下降。因此再造商往往迫于一定的压力实施让利公平关切,并且让利程度有限,一般不超过0.5。从长远来看,再造商的让利公平关切能够稳固EC-CLSC的稳定运行。(2)联合决策下,废旧品回收价格达到最高,电商平台佣金最低,系统利润最优,采用文章设计的"回收成本共担联合收益共享"契约可以实现系统协调。(3)在协调机制中,再造商分担电商平台的成本比例恰好等于分得的系统利润比例。而且随着佣金的降低,再造商分担电商平台服务成本的比例和电商平台分享再造商收益的比例均会增加。这些结论丰富完善了电商闭环供应链的理论基础,为电商闭环供应链成员的决策提供一定的理论参考。

关键词: 电商平台, 让利公平关切, 电商闭环供应链, 协调机制

Abstract: At present, the recycling of waste as a development strategy has received increasing attention. Through the e-commerce platform, the waste products are recycled from customers and disposed of or reused, which forms E-commerce Closed-loop Supply Chain (EC-CLSC). In order to avoid the conflict with the e-commerce platform because of the profit division, the altruistic fairness concern behavior is adopted by the remanufacturer. In order to analyze the impact of altruistic fairness concern on the operation of EC-CLSC, a decision model composed of a single remanufacturer and a single e-commerce platform is constructed in this paper. Then, the optimal decision of each decision-making model is given and the impact of the altruistic fairness concern on recovery pricing, commission and members' profits are analyzed.
Three decision models of EC-CLSC are constructed in this paper. The first is decentralized decision-making without altruistic fairness concern. In this model, the profit function of the remanufacturer is πm=(h-ρ-p)q, and the profit function of e-commerce platform is πe=ρq-2/2.The second is the decentralized decision-making with altruistic fairness concern. In this model, the decision-making function of the remanufacturer is its utility function Um=πm-θme).The third is joint decision-making. Then, the optimal decisions of three models are solved and analyzed. On this basis, the contract of "recovery cost sharing and joint revenue sharing" of EC-CLSC is designed to realize the coordination of the system. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusions of the models. The results show that:(1) the altruistic fairness concern of remanufacturer is a strategy that has to be adopted in order to improve the recovery rate of waste products and maintain the stable development of the EC-CLSC system. This kind of fairness concern is disadvantageous to the remanufacturer. But when the degree of altruistic fairness concern is not more than 0.5, it will improve the profits of the e-commerce platform and the EC-CLSC system. Therefore, remanufacturers generally do not take the initiative to choose altruistic fairness concern, but are often under pressure to consider altruistic fairness concern, and the degree is limited. But in the long run, the altruistic fairness concern of remanufacturers reflects the sense of corporate social responsibility, which can stabilize the operation of EC-CLSC. (2) As the economic benefits of recycled products become more and more significant, consumers become more sensitive to recovery prices, and the recovery prices, the commission, and the profits of members all increase. (3) In the joint decision-making, the recovery price of waste products is the highest and the commission is the lowest. The system coordination can be realized through the contract of "recovery cost sharing and joint revenue sharing". Under this coordination mechanism, the proportion of costs shared by remanufacturers is exactly equal to the share of system profit. And in the coordination mechanism, with the decrease of commission, the proportion of remanufacturers sharing the service cost of e-commerce platform and the proportion of e-commerce platform sharing the profits of remanufacturers will increase.
Thus it can be seen that in practice, remanufacturers should actively communicate with e-commerce platforms, not only pay attention to their own profits, but also pay attention to the benefits of e-commerce platforms. And, the remanufacturers should take the initiative to share the cost of e-commerce platform recovery services, make appropriate "altruism fairness concern" to e-commerce platforms, and prevent dissatisfaction from the e-commerce platforms.
The conclusion of this paper can not only enrich the theoretical basis of e-commerce supply chain, but also provide theoretical reference for the recycling decision of EC-CLSC members.

Key words: e-commerce platform, altruistic fairness concern, e-commerce closed-loop supply chain, coordination mechanism

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