主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (8): 123-133.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.08.013

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于演化博弈的区域突发事件组织合作治理策略分析

徐松鹤1, 韩传峰2, 邵志国2   

  1. 1. 浙江师范大学经济与管理学院, 浙江 金华 321004;
    2. 同济大学 经济与管理学院, 上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2016-06-26 修回日期:2016-12-31 出版日期:2017-08-20 发布日期:2017-10-16
  • 通讯作者: 徐松鹤(1987-),男(汉族),河南商丘人,浙江师范大学经济与管理学院,博士,讲师,研究方向:公共安全与区域治理等,E-mail:songheyouxiang@163.com. E-mail:songheyouxiang@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(91224003,71403186)

Analysis on Collaborative Governance of Regional Contingencies based on Evolutionary Game Theory

XU Song-he1, HAN Chuan-feng2, SHAO Zhi-guo2   

  1. 1. College of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua 321004, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
  • Received:2016-06-26 Revised:2016-12-31 Online:2017-08-20 Published:2017-10-16

摘要: 伴随我国区域经济一体化进程的推进,区域性突发事件日益增多,组织合作治理成为区域地方政府的必然选择。本文针对区域突发事件合作治理,从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了区域地方政府组织行为的演化过程,建立了考虑组织决策固定成本和组织社会资本的地方政府组织行为演化博弈模型,得到地方政府组织合作的行为演化规律和演化稳定策略,分析了地方政府组织行为演化路径的初始敏感性。研究结果表明,区域突发事件组织合作治理的演化博弈系统具有复杂的演进路径,演化稳定状态取决于地方政府组织策略选择的初始状态和区域内政府组织的社会资本存量及固定成本。研究结论可以为区域突发事件组织合作治理机制优化提供指导。

关键词: 演化博弈, 区域突发事件, 合作治理, 社会资本

Abstract: Regional contingencies are becoming more frequent occurrences along with the advancement of China's regional economic integration. Collaborative governance becomes the inevitable choice of local government in one area. China's increasing emphasis on regional cooperation in response to emergencies, emphasizing the coordination of local government organizations within the region, but with little success. For the collaborative governance of regional contingencies, evolutionary process of decision among local government from the perspective of evolutionary game theory is discussed. The evolutionary game model considering fixed cost and social capital of decision between local governments is established. Behavioral evolutionary law and evolutionarily stable strategies are given. The sensitive to initial value in evolutionary paths of local government behavior is analyzed. The results show that the evolutionary paths of collaborative governance of regional contingencies are complicated. Evolutionary stable state depends on the initial status of the strategy and social capital and fixed costs of local government. The organizational behavior in regional emergent event cooperation governance is studied from the perspective of dynamic game. The conclusion of this study can provide guidance for the optimization ofcollaborative governance mechanism.

Key words: evolutionary game, regional contingencies, collaborative governance, social capital

中图分类号: