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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (5): 144-148.

• 论文 • 上一篇    

流域跨界水污染纠纷税收调控管理模型研究

赵来军1,2, 李怀祖1   

  1. 1. 西安交通大学 管理学院 陕西 西安 710049;
    2. 西安石油大学 陕西 西安 710065
  • 收稿日期:2003-10-15 修回日期:2004-06-29 出版日期:2004-10-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    陕西省西安市社科基金项目(R200250)

Study on Model for Regulation and Control with Tax of Transboundary Water Pollution Dissensions

ZHAO Lai-jun1,2, LI Huai-zu 1   

  1. 1. Management School, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China;
    2. Xi’an Shiyou University, Xi’an 710065, China
  • Received:2003-10-15 Revised:2004-06-29 Online:2004-10-28 Published:2012-03-07

PDF (PC)

1672

被引次数

25

摘要： 在分析我国目前的指令配额管理模型和排污收费制度存在的诸多问题的基础上,提出用税收手段解决我国日益严重的流域跨界水污染纠纷的思路。结合我国流域的非畅流特点,提出了污染物人工调控和污染物间接不影响等几个基本假定,构建了流域跨界水污染结构描述模型。建立了流域跨界水污染税收调控Stackelberg博弈模型,并用理想点法求解出博弈模型的数值解。通过淮河流域的实证分析,得出税收调控管理模型明显优于指令配额管理模型的结论。最后分析了影响税收调控管理模型实施效果的诸多因素。

关键词: 流域, 跨界水污染, 纠纷, 税收

Abstract: Many problems in management model of appointed quota of pollution reduction and emissions-charge system of China have been analyzed in the paper.Transboundary water pollution dissensions can be sovled by means of tax.Several basic hypotheses have been supposed,and model of structure description of transboundary water pollution is brought forward combining the Chinese circumstances.Stackelberg game model of regulation and control with tax is brought forward,and numerical method of game model is brought forward too.The con-clusion is that management model of regulation and control with tax is superior to that of appointed quota of pol-lution reduction by means of application to Huaihe River Valley.Some factors affecting management model have been analyzed in the end.

Key words: river valley, tranboundary water pollution, dissension, tax

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