逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制与税收——补贴机制比较研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.04.012

中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (4): 102-110.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.04.012

逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制与税收——补贴机制比较研究

王文宾, 邓雯雯

中国矿业大学管理学院, 江苏徐州 221116

收稿日期:2014-05-07 修回日期:2015-05-11 出版日期:2016-04-20 发布日期:2016-04-29
通讯作者: 王文宾(1979-),男(汉族),山东诸城人,中国矿业大学管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,研究方向:物流与供应链管理,E-mail:wangwenbin818@126.com. E-mail:wangwenbin818@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102164,71271054);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2013W02);四川循环经济研究中心规划重点项目(XHJJ-1508)

Comparison between the Reward-penalty Mechanism with the Tax-subsidy Mechanism for Reverse Supply Chains

WANG Wen-bin, DENG Wen-wen

School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China

Received:2014-05-07 Revised:2015-05-11 Online:2016-04-20 Published:2016-04-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了比较政府奖惩机制和税收-补贴机制对于提高逆向供应链回收率的有效性,运用动态博弈论方法建立了逆向供应链的三个回收再制造决策模型,即无政府介入、奖惩机制下以及税收-补贴机制下逆向供应链的决策,并比较了三种情形下的决策结果。研究表明:三种情形下回收率都随着再制造成本优势的增加而提高,其中奖惩机制下的回收率最高;制造商和回收商的利润都随着再制造成本优势的提高而增加,其中奖惩机制下利润提高的幅度较大;制造商的回购价格随着奖惩力度和再制造成本优势的提高而提高,随着单位补贴和再制造成本优势的提高而下降。通过对两种机制决策结果的比较发现,奖惩机制对引导逆向供应链成员积极回收再制造废旧产品比税收-补贴机制更有效。最后通过算例分析进一步验证了上述结论的正确性。

关键词: 奖惩机制, 税收-补贴机制, 回收再制造

Abstract: In order to compare the reward-penalty mechanism and the tax-subsidy mechanism for increasing the efficiency of reverse supply chain^, collection rate. Three models are established and the results are compared. The three models are no government intervention mechanism, the reward-penalty mechanism and the tax-subsidy mechanism case using the dynamic game theory.This study shows that: the collection rate is increasing with the increase of the remanufacture cost advantage in the three models, and among them, the highest collection rate incurs under the reward-penalty mechanism. When the manufacturer has remanufacturing cost has advantage, the profit of manufacturers and recycler increases with the increasing of the remanufacture cost advantage, and the collection rate increase with the reward-penalty mechanism is the highest among the three models. The manufacturer's buy-back price rises with the increase of the reward-penalty intensity and remanufacture cost advantage, while it decreases with the increasing of the per-unit subsidy and remanufacture cost advantage. It can be safely concluded that the reward-penalty mechanism is the most effective way to encourage the manufacturers, recyclers and consumers. Finally a numerical example is given to prove the above conclusions.

Key words: the reward-penalty mechanism, the tax-subsidy mechanism, collection and remanufacture

中图分类号:

F224

王文宾, 邓雯雯 . 逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制与税收——补贴机制比较研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(4): 102-110.

WANG Wen-bin, DENG Wen-wen. Comparison between the Reward-penalty Mechanism with the Tax-subsidy Mechanism for Reverse Supply Chains[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(4): 102-110.

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逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制与税收——补贴机制比较研究

Comparison between the Reward-penalty Mechanism with the Tax-subsidy Mechanism for Reverse Supply Chains

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